936 F.3d 489
6th Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiff Karla Brintley, a blind Michigan resident who uses a screen reader, sued two Michigan domestic credit unions (Aeroquip CU and Belle River Community CU) under the ADA and Michigan law, alleging their websites were inaccessible.
- The credit unions are state-chartered and may serve only persons within narrowly defined fields of membership under Michigan law (common-bond requirement).
- Brintley visited the credit unions’ websites and alleges parts were unreadable by her screen reader, but she did not allege any concrete plans to become eligible for membership in either credit union.
- District court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing; the Sixth Circuit panel reversed.
- The Sixth Circuit majority held Brintley failed to allege an injury in fact because Michigan law bars her from obtaining the credit unions’ services and she alleged no concrete, imminent plans to change that.
- Concurrence (Judge White) agreed with reversal but emphasized her agreement rests only on Brintley’s failure to allege usable information/services on the sites, not a categorical rule about non-members’ standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing (injury in fact) to sue over inaccessible credit-union websites | Brintley contends she suffered a concrete injury because her screen reader could not access website content she visited and she wishes to avail herself of the services | Credit unions argue Brintley is barred by Michigan law from membership and thus cannot suffer an injury tied to services she cannot obtain; no concrete plans to become eligible | No standing: injury not concrete/particularized because state-law membership barrier and lack of concrete plans to become eligible |
| Tester status / civil-rights solicitude | Testers should receive special solicitude and may sue as private attorneys general to vindicate civil-rights violations | Tester status does not eliminate Article III requirements; statutory standing separate from constitutional standing | Tester status does not excuse the requirement to allege an Article III injury in fact |
| Informational/informational-entitlement injury from inaccessible website content | The inaccessibility caused a cognizable informational harm and dignitary injury (unable to access tools, locators, calculators) | Any informational injury must be tied to plaintiff’s real, personal interest in the information; mere browsing or speculative usefulness is insufficient | Rejected: plaintiff failed to allege information had some relevance to her; procedural informational violation alone insufficient |
| Dignitary/stigmatic injury standing | Inaccessibility inflicted dignitary harm sufficient for standing even if plaintiff is not eligible for services | Dignitary harms must be personal and particularized; being legally ineligible prevents being "personally subject" to the discrimination | Rejected: dignitary injury too attenuated where plaintiff is barred from the services and lacks the necessary personal connection |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishes injury-in-fact requirement: concrete, particularized, actual or imminent)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (procedural violations alone may not confer Article III standing absent concrete injury)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (civil-rights/accommodation scope discussed; Court has not definitively resolved client/non-client applicability)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (testers and standing under civil-rights statutes; statutory standing distinct from Article III)
- Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (broad reading of standing under civil-rights statutes)
- Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (dignitary/stigmatic injury must be personal and particularized)
- Griffin v. Dep’t of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 2019) (credit-union website claims dismissed where plaintiff barred by law from membership)
- Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2009) (informational harms require relevance to plaintiff)
- Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1998) (non-client can have standing when they demonstrate independent injury)