Karl Risinger v. Soc LLC
708 F. App'x 304
9th Cir.2017Background
- Plaintiff Karl E. Risinger worked as an armed guard for SOC in Iraq between 2006 and 2012 and sued on behalf of a class of guards.
- Risinger alleges SOC misrepresented the anticipated work schedule (a 6-day, 72-hour workweek) during recruitment and breached an employment-term requiring performance of "customary" duties.
- SOC’s DoD contract and recruiter scripts referenced a 6-day, 72-hour workweek; recruiters allegedly made nearly identical oral representations to recruits.
- The district court found the term "customary" in the employment agreement ambiguous and concluded common evidence could resolve whether a 72-hour week was "customary."
- The court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), finding common issues (misrepresentation, materiality, reliance, contract interpretation) predominated.
- SOC appealed the class certification, arguing predominance was lacking and raising Rules Enabling Act, due process, and Article III objections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether misrepresentation element is amenable to class-wide proof (predominance) | Recruiters made uniform representations of a 72‑hour workweek; class-wide proof suffices | Representations varied and require individualized proof | Court: Predominance met — recruiters used standardized scripts and similar testimony supports common proof |
| Whether contract interpretation of "customary" predominates | "Customary" is ambiguous; class-wide evidence can resolve if 72 hours was customary | Interpretation will depend on individual duties and experiences | Court: Predominance met — ambiguity exists and common evidence can resolve it |
| Whether materiality and reliance on the recruitment statements can be proven class-wide | Guards were exposed to same scripts; reliance presumed in Nevada fraud law | Reliance and materiality are individualized | Court: Predominance met — exposure and materiality found common; Nevada would recognize a presumption of reliance |
| Whether certification violates Rules Enabling Act, due process, or Article III | Certification appropriate; individual challenges remain for damages phase | Certification violates Rules Enabling Act/due process/Article III | Court: Rejected SOC’s challenges; certification consistent with precedent and can be refined at damages stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for class certification).
- Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (predominance/cohesion requirement under Rule 23(b)(3)).
- Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) (definition of common vs. individual questions for class proof).
- United States v. Working, 224 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (permissibility of treating similar statements as effectively identical in assessing uniformity).
- In re First All. Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (class-wide proof of misrepresentation element).
- Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 P.2d 68 (Nev. 1973) (recognition/approval of presumption of reliance in fraud context).
- Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (Rules Enabling Act and certification do not preclude later sufficiency challenges and winnowing non-injured class members).
AFFIRMED.