166 So. 3d 959
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Karim H. Saadeh, an elderly man, became subject to emergency temporary guardianship after concerns about loans he made; a neurologist reported probable Alzheimer’s.
- Colette Meyer served as counsel for the emergency temporary guardian; Saadeh had separate court‑appointed counsel.
- The guardian, guardian’s attorney, and Saadeh’s attorney agreed that Saadeh would execute an irrevocable trust in exchange for dismissal of incapacity proceedings; Saadeh later challenged the trust and regained competency.
- Saadeh sued the guardian’s attorney for professional negligence, alleging the attorney pressured him, misrepresented control over the trust, failed to advise on tax consequences, and was paid from the ward’s estate.
- The trial court entered summary judgment for the guardian’s attorney, holding no duty existed to Saadeh as a third‑party beneficiary; Saadeh appealed.
- The Fourth District reversed, holding as a matter of law that an attorney for an emergency temporary guardian who is compensated from the ward’s estate can owe a duty of care to the ward as an intended beneficiary; case remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether attorney for guardian owed duty to alleged incapacitated person under third‑party beneficiary theory | Saadeh: as ward and the intended object of guardianship statutes, he was the primary beneficiary of services paid from his estate and thus owed a duty | Meyer: no privity with Saadeh; services were to guardian, not ward; interests adverse; statute bars guardian’s counsel from representing ward | Court: Ward is the intended primary beneficiary of guardianship services; counsel compensated from ward’s estate owes duty to ward; reversed summary judgment |
| Whether Florida third‑party beneficiary exception to privity applies outside will‑drafting context | Saadeh: guardianship statutes and purpose show intent to benefit ward, so exception applies | Meyer: exception is narrow and typically limited to wills; here no clear intent to benefit ward | Court: Exception can apply; guardianship context makes it apparent the ward is intended beneficiary |
| Proper role of statutes and precedent in defining duty | Saadeh: statutes (purpose of Chapter 744) and AGO support duty to ward | Meyer: statutory prohibition on counsel serving both ward and guardian shows separation of interests; likened to adversarial plea negotiation | Court: Statutes and public policy support protecting ward as primary beneficiary; duty exists despite separate representation |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment on duty element | Saadeh: disputed facts about pressure, misrepresentation, taxation advice create triable issues on breach/damages; but duty is question of law | Meyer: duty lacking as matter of law so summary judgment proper | Court: Duty exists as matter of law; summary judgment reversing required; remanded for breach/damages determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Jasser v. Saadeh, 97 So. 3d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (prior appeal recounting guardianship facts and trust‑setting dispute)
- Rushing v. Bosse, 652 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (attorney for adoptive parents owed duty to child as intended beneficiary in adoption context)
- Dingle v. Dellinger, 134 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (malpractice privity rule and third‑party beneficiary exception explained)
- Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (third‑party beneficiary exception applied in will‑drafting context)
- Chhabra v. Morales, 906 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Hewko v. Genovese, 739 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (intent to benefit third party must be apparent)
- Maxwell v. First Union Bank, 782 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (guardian/ward creates fiduciary relationship)
- Centrust Savings Bank v. Barnett Banks Trust Co., N.A., 483 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (definition and scope of fiduciary relationships)