KAREN THOMPSON v. WILLIAM H. ARMSTRONG., 134 A.3d 305

Background

William Armstrong, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) at TIGTA, had been offered a USDA law-enforcement job; USDA rescinded the offer after receiving anonymous letters alleging Armstrong was under internal investigation for integrity violations.
Armstrong sued Karen Thompson (the letter-writer) on multiple tort theories, including intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.
On initial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all claims; this court (Armstrong I) affirmed dismissal of defamation and related privacy and emotional-distress claims but reversed as to the intentional-interference claim and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand Thompson invoked the First Amendment and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772(a) (truthful information defense); the trial judge declined to consider § 772(a) as law of the case and treated the First Amendment defense as waived. The case proceeded to trial and a jury returned a verdict for Armstrong.
On appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals held (1) Armstrong I established waiver of the § 772(a) defense (law of the case), but (2) Armstrong I did not foreclose Thompson’s First Amendment defense; the court therefore reached the First Amendment issues itself.
The court concluded Armstrong was a public official, Thompson’s statements related to his official conduct and matters of public concern, and that the statements were either substantially true or not provably false—so First Amendment protections barred liability; the court reversed and directed entry of judgment for Thompson.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Restatement § 772(a) (truthful-information defense) bars liability	Armstrong: § 772(a) defense was waived and Armstrong I foreclosed it	Thompson: § 772(a) would bar liability for truthful communications	Waived by Armstrong I and law of the case; trial court correctly refused to consider it on remand
Whether First Amendment bars liability for Thompson’s statements	Armstrong: First Amendment defense was foreclosed by Armstrong I/motions division	Thompson: Truthful or non-provably-false statements about a public official to a government agency are constitutionally protected	Court held Armstrong I did not decide First Amendment; reached the issue on merits and found First Amendment protection applies
Whether Armstrong was a "public official" requiring proof of actual malice	Armstrong: He was a government employee, not necessarily a public official	Thompson: As a supervisory federal law-enforcement agent (ASAC) he was a public official	Held: Armstrong was a public official (supervisory law-enforcement officer with heightened trust/responsibility)
Whether statements related to official conduct / public concern	Armstrong: Letters were personal vendetta, not matters of public concern	Thompson: Letters concerned alleged misconduct affecting fitness for public office and thus public concern	Held: Statements related to official conduct and public concern; truth/falsity standard and actual-malice rules apply

Key Cases Cited

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (public officials must prove actual malice to recover for defamatory falsehoods)
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (speech criticizing public officials outweighed private reputation; intent to harm insufficient for malice)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 479 U.S. 1 (opinions without provably false factual connotations get full constitutional protection)
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (First Amendment limits intentional-infliction claims arising from speech)
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (First Amendment interaction with state-law torts)
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (speech on matters of public concern is core First Amendment protection)
Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (actual malice requirement entails falsity)
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (public official standard: those with substantial responsibility for governmental affairs)
Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177 (D.C. 2013) (earlier appellate decision resolving truth/defamation issues and remanding intentional-interference claim)
Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918 (D.C. 2001) (law-enforcement officers with supervisory roles are public officials)
Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979) (summary-judgment standard for actual malice)