Karen Garrison v. Carolyn W. Colvin
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13315
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Karen Garrison applied for Social Security disability benefits claiming severe, chronic neck/back pain with radiculopathy and multiple serious mental impairments (bipolar disorder, PTSD, hallucinations, panic) beginning April 17, 2007.
- Treating providers (neurologist Dr. George Wang and nurse practitioner Susan Anderson) documented persistent pain, numbness/tingling, weakness, medication side effects, pseudo‑seizures, hallucinations, low GAF scores, and functional limits in check‑box assessments lasting >12 months.
- State agency consultants issued checkbox opinions (one non‑examining, one examining) that supported greater functional capacity than the treating sources; a vocational expert testified that a person with the treating/examining providers’ limitations could not sustain work.
- The ALJ discounted Garrison’s symptom testimony and assigned little weight to Wang and Anderson while giving substantial weight to state agency opinions, finding Garrison capable of light, simple work and able to perform past jobs.
- The district court found the ALJ erred in evaluating medical opinion evidence and remanded for further proceedings; Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and also found the ALJ erred in rejecting symptom testimony.
- Applying the Ninth Circuit’s credit‑as‑true framework, the court held the record satisfied the test and ordered reversal with instructions to remand for calculation and award of benefits rather than another administrative hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons to reject Garrison’s symptom testimony | ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons; medical records and daily‑activity testimony are consistent with disabling symptoms | ALJ relied on periods of improvement and daily activities to discredit testimony | Reversed: ALJ’s reasons were not specific, clear, and convincing; mischaracterized records and activities were not inconsistent with disability |
| Whether the ALJ permissibly discounted treating/examining opinions (Wang, Anderson) | Treating clinicians’ opinions are supported by extensive records and entitled to deference; ALJ ignored or misapplied regulatory factors | Commissioner justified reliance on state‑agency opinions and criticized checkbox forms | Reversed: ALJ failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons and misunderstood/excluded relevant treatment records; treating/examining opinions improperly discounted |
| Whether the district court should have remanded for more proceedings rather than award benefits | Garrison argued credit‑as‑true applies and benefits should be awarded because (1) record fully developed, (2) ALJ erred in rejecting evidence, (3) credited evidence compels disability finding | Commissioner urged further proceedings to reassess RFC and medical evidence | Reversed district court: Ninth Circuit applied credit‑as‑true, found all three prongs met, and ordered remand for calculation and award of benefits |
| Applicability and scope of the credit‑as‑true rule when ALJ errors exist | Credit‑as‑true applies where record is complete, ALJ erred in rejecting evidence, and credited evidence mandates finding of disability; flexibility exists only where record creates serious doubt about disability | Commissioner contended remand for further proceedings was appropriate | Held: Credit‑as‑true applied; Connett flexibility discussed but no serious doubt in record, so benefits awarded rather than another administrative remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1988) (establishing credit‑as‑true principle when no outstanding issues remain)
- Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying credit‑as‑true to medical opinion evidence)
- Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007) (substantial‑evidence standard and application of credit‑as‑true factors)
- Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996) (two‑step pain/symptom credibility test and requirement of clear and convincing reasons to reject testimony)
- Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1998) (weight to treating physician and ALJ’s duty to provide specific, legitimate reasons to reject such opinions)
- Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (hierarchy of medical opinions: treating, examining, non‑examining)
- Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2003) (credit‑as‑true rule admits flexibility where record creates serious doubt)
- Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989) (vocational expert testimony is probative only if hypothetical matches medical record)