Karen Berenguela-Alvarado v. Eric Castanos, 950 F.3d 1352

EICB, born in Chile (2012), lived habitually in Chile with mother Karen Berenguela-Alvarado; father Eric Castanos is a U.S. citizen who visited frequently.
EICB visited Castanos in the U.S. Dec 2018–Mar 2019 on a round-trip ticket; mother authorized an extension through March 2019 and permissive stay through end of March.
In Feb 2019 Castanos asked that EICB remain in the U.S.; Berenguela-Alvarado signed a February 10, 2019 “consent” letter after alleging Castanos pressured and threatened she would never see the child again if she refused.
Castanos arranged notarization via a third party after Berenguela-Alvarado sent a photo of the signed letter; Berenguela-Alvarado later emailed that she had “changed [her] mind” and sought the child’s return when travel authorization expired.
Berenguela-Alvarado filed Hague/ICARA petitions in Chile and the Southern District of Florida; the district court found a prima facie case of wrongful retention but concluded Berenguela-Alvarado consented and denied return, citing the consent letter and treating alleged duress as unproven.
The Eleventh Circuit held the district court erred factually (it wrongly found Castanos denied threatening the mother) and legally (it improperly shifted the burden to the mother to prove duress), vacated and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Berenguela-Alvarado consented to EICB’s retention in the U.S.	She signed the consent letter under coercion/threat and never subjectively intended to allow permanent retention.	The signed consent letter (and subsequent email) demonstrates consent; consent is not required to be formal and cannot be revoked.	Court vacated district court: district court erred by relying on a nonexistent denial of threats and by placing the burden on the mother; remanded for further proceedings.
Who bears the burden to disprove consent/establish duress after a prima facie wrongful retention?	Once prima facie wrongful retention established, mother need not prove duress; defendant must prove consent by a preponderance.	District court treated mother’s duress claim as an affirmative matter she had to prove.	Court held the defendant (retaining parent) carries the burden to prove consent; district court improperly shifted burden to mother.

Pfeiffer v. Bachotet, 913 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2019) (standard of review and Hague/ICARA background)
Seaman v. Peterson, 766 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2014) (clear-error standard for factual findings)
Stano v. Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1995) (deference to credibility findings)
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1985) (standard for reviewing factual findings)
Chafin v. Chafin, 742 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2014) (Hague Convention return remedy explanation)
Gomez v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirmative defenses under the Hague Convention should be construed narrowly)
Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005) (focus on petitioner’s subjective intent when assessing consent)
Lindmeier v. Lindmeier, 867 So. 2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (example where undisputed threat vitiated consent)