Karanja L. Cobbert v. State of Mississippi
2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 387
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2008 Karanja Cobbert pleaded guilty to commercial burglary and received 7 years, with 6 years suspended and 5 years of post-release supervision (PRS).
- First PRS revocation (Dec. 2014) found three technical violations: failure to report, failure to pay supervision fees, and failure to pay court costs; court sentenced Cobbert to 90 days at a Technical Violation Center (TVC).
- After release, Cobbert again failed to report and was arrested on new charges; at the second revocation he admitted failing to report. The court revoked PRS and ordered the remainder of the suspended sentence.
- Cobbert filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) motion arguing the second revocation was a "technical violation" and therefore the court could not impose more than 120 days at a TVC under Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-37(5)(a).
- The circuit court denied PCR; the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, holding the fourth separate technical violation authorized imposition of the remainder of the suspended sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court exceeded authority by imposing remainder of suspended sentence after second revocation | Cobbert: second revocation was a technical violation so §47-7-37(5)(a) limits TVC term to 120 days | State: statute counts individual technical violations (acts/omissions); Cobbert committed four separate technical violations, so court could impose remainder | Court held for State: four separate technical violations allowed imposition of remainder of suspended sentence |
| Proper reading of “technical violation” and whether counts aggregate across revocations | Cobbert: a revocation should be classified (1st, 2nd, etc.) and limits apply per revocation | State: statute refers to the ordinal number of the technical violation (not the ordinal number of the revocation); multiple separate acts count individually | Court held statute’s plain language counts each act/omission as a technical violation; no rewriting of statute |
| Precedential tension with Walker v. State | Cobbert: Walker suggests a contrary result (revocation limited to TVC term) | State/Majority: Walker misapplied statute and should be overruled | Court overruled/declined Walker to the extent it conflicts with plain statutory text |
| Whether overlapping conditions in a single act can produce multiple technical violations affecting sentence | Cobbert (and dissent): one act may violate multiple conditions so revocation may encompass multiple violations but should be treated in revocation-count terms | State/Majority: acknowledge overlap is possible but not present here; count distinct acts/omissions | Court: overlap hypothetical irrelevant—here there were four separate acts/omissions, so sentence lawful |
Key Cases Cited
- Bester v. State, 188 So.3d 526 (Miss. 2016) (statutory plain-meaning interpretation principle)
- Miss. Dep’t of Transp. v. Allred, 928 So.2d 152 (Miss. 2006) (Legislative text is best evidence of intent)
- Pegram v. Bailey, 708 So.2d 1307 (Miss. 1997) (textualist canon of statutory interpretation)
- Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 75 So.3d 1024 (Miss. 2011) (apply plain meaning when statute is clear)
- Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815 (Miss. 2006) (constitutional duty to apply enacted statutes)