Kaplan v. City of Sugar Land, 525 S.W.3d 297

Background

Kaplan, age 69, worked as Administrative Manager for Sugar Land Parks & Recreation since 2005 and was responsible for budgets, front-office supervision, cultural arts payments, and liaison duties for the Sugar Land Legacy Foundation.
In summer 2011 the City documented a rapid decline in Kaplan’s performance and several episodes of perceived insubordination (rude email to a coworker; a memorandum challenging supervisors; leaving the front office unattended; napping at work).
The City removed some of Kaplan’s duties (Legacy Foundation and cultural arts) and ultimately offered him resignation/retirement as an alternative to discharge; Kaplan refused and accused the City of age discrimination; the City terminated him December 8, 2011.
Kaplan sued under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (age discrimination). The City moved for traditional and no‑evidence summary judgment; the trial court granted judgment for the City. Kaplan appealed.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo, found Kaplan established a prima facie age‑discrimination case (age, termination, minimally qualified, replaced by younger worker), but held the City produced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (poor performance and insubordination) and Kaplan produced no evidence of pretext.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Kaplan proved a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas	Kaplan: he was over 40, qualified (held job ~6 years, no disability), terminated, and replaced by someone significantly younger	City: disputed qualification (performance below expectations) and disputed that he was replaced by a single younger person	Court: Kaplan satisfied prima facie elements under Bienkowski standard (minimal qualification + evidence of replacement); prima facie established
Standard for whether employee is "qualified" for prima facie case	Kaplan: long tenure presumes minimal qualification; courts should not evaluate performance at prima facie stage	City: qualification should be measured by whether employee met employer’s performance expectations at time of firing	Held: Court follows Bienkowski — focus on basic ability/absence of disqualifying disability or loss of license, not quality of work; Kaplan was minimally qualified
Whether the City articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination	Kaplan: City’s performance criticisms were pretextual and age motivated	City: produced undisputed evidence of repeated poor performance and insubordination (budget errors, missed tasks, rude email, leaving desk unattended, memo challenging supervisors)	Held: City conclusively proved legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (satisfied burden for traditional SJ)
Whether Kaplan produced evidence the City’s reasons were pretext for age discrimination	Kaplan: pointed to perceived procedural irregularities and replacement of older employees	City: pointed to Kaplan’s admissions and lack of any evidence supervisors considered age; argued mere dispute of facts is insufficient	Held: Kaplan failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence of pretext or discriminatory motive; no‑evidence SJ proper

Key Cases Cited

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 666 (Texas 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment)
AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) (state law construed with reference to federal discrimination law)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1988) (prima facie "qualified" means not disabled or otherwise unfit — minimal qualification standard)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (employer’s burden to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and plaintiff’s burden to show pretext)
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1996) (replacement must be sufficiently younger to permit inference of age discrimination)