Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Strong, 356 P.3d 1064

Background

KCPL condemned a 12-acre easement across 2 tracts (combined ~460 acres) owned by trusts for Daniel and Evelyn Strong; court-appointed appraisers awarded $96,465, but a jury awarded $1,922,559 to the Strongs. KCPL appealed.
KCPL challenged admission of the Strongs’ expert evidence under K.S.A. 26-513(e), contending the Strongs failed to use statutorily authorized appraisal methods for fair market value.
Strongs’ experts: developer James Lambie (concept plans showing subdivision options, testified as a hypothetical buyer/developer) and appraiser Troy Smith (used comparable-sales for pre-taking value and applied adjustments informed by Lambie and concept plans for post-taking value).
KCPL’s experts valued pre-taking property similarly as agricultural-with-investment-premium; both KCPL experts testified the easement caused little to no diminution by acreage subtraction.
District court admitted Lambie’s and Smith’s testimony and three hypothetical development exhibits; it excluded the Sailors option contract price but allowed testimony the 2004 option existed and that a developer sought sewer access.
On appeal KCPL argued (1) the Strongs’ valuation violated K.S.A. 26-513(e); (2) the court improperly admitted a nonstatutory “development approach” without proof development was imminent; and (3) admission of evidence of the 2004 option contract was erroneous. Court affirmed the judgment.

Issues

Issue	Strongs’ Argument	KCPL’s Argument	Held
Whether the Strongs’ post-taking valuation evidence complied with K.S.A. 26-513(e)	Smith used statutory comparable-sales for pre-taking and applied K.S.A. 26-513(d) factors (appearance, use, severance, discount) informed by developer evidence to calculate post-taking value	Strongs failed to use one of the three statutorily authorized methods for post-taking value; Lambie was not an appraiser and his methods were unreliable	Admissible and legally sufficient: statute requires statutory methods for pre-taking FMV but allows the remainder’s value to be shown by §26-513(d) adjustments; Smith’s appraisal plus Lambie’s developer evidence provided a proper foundation
Whether the court improperly relied on a common-law “development approach” without showing development was imminent	The evidence fits within §26-513(d) adjustments and developer testimony simply informed those adjustments; development approach (if used) is recognized in prior precedent	If court admitted a development-based valuation, it required foundation that development was imminent, which Strongs did not establish	Court did not reach whether the development approach remains independently viable; even if the court referenced it, result was legally correct under §26-513, so no reversible error
Whether Lambie’s testimony should have been excluded/struck as unqualified and speculative	Lambie testified as a hypothetical buyer/developer; his opinions were relevant to what a developer would consider and informed Smith’s appraisal	Lambie admitted he was not an appraiser, did not use statutory methods, and relied on hypothetical plans and a post-report date	Trial court did not abuse discretion: Lambie’s developer testimony was relevant to statutory §26-513(d) factors and provided admissible foundation for Smith’s expert adjustments
Whether admitting evidence of a 2004 option contract (existence, not price) was improper due to remoteness/irrelevance	Existence of option shows developer interest, supports highest-and-best-use and adaptability under §26-513(d)	Contract was remote and KCPL sought to exclude its relevance; contract price and terms were prejudicial	Not an abuse of discretion to admit existence of option while excluding price/terms; developer interest was material and probative to statutory factors

Key Cases Cited

State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 (review of statutory interpretation is unlimited)
City of Wichita v. Denton, 296 Kan. 244 (challenge to legal basis for admission reviewed de novo)
State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903 (statutory interpretation; legislative intent governs)
State v. O’Connor, 299 Kan. 819 (plain statutory language controls)
Hays v. Ruther, 298 Kan. 402 (presumption that legislative word choice is deliberate)
City of Mission Hills v. Sexton, 284 Kan. 414 (competent evidence of market value includes factors a hypothetical buyer/seller would consider)
City of Wichita v. Eisenring, 269 Kan. 767 (trial court has broad latitude admitting collateral facts to support value estimates)
State Highway Comm’n v. Lee, 207 Kan. 284 (development approach described for suburban land valuation)
Mooney v. City of Overland Park, 283 Kan. 617 (trial court’s broad discretion in eminent domain evidence)
In re Acquisition of Property by Eminent Domain, 299 Kan. 37 (relevancy: materiality reviewed de novo, probative value for abuse-of-discretion review)
Miller v. Glacier Dev. Co., 284 Kan. 476 (prior purchase price too remote to establish FMV at taking)
Manhattan Ice & Cold Storage v. City of Manhattan, 294 Kan. 60 (temporal remoteness can render value estimates inadmissible)