Kanciper v. Lato, 16-4219

Background

Kanciper operated a Long Island horse farm. The Suffolk County SPCA received complaints alleging animal abuse and collected witness statements describing incidents between 2008–2010.
SPCA sought search warrants; the Case Advisory Bureau initially declined but Lato (DA’s Insurance Crimes Bureau chief) later drafted warrant materials after additional statements were obtained.
A magistrate issued warrants; SPCA executed the Farm search on March 20, 2010; Lato was present and assisted in obtaining a piggyback warrant for Kanciper’s home. A grand jury later indicted Kanciper for animal cruelty and endangering a child.
After a bench trial Kanciper was convicted of endangering a minor, but the New York Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the indictment for insufficient evidence.
Kanciper sued Lato and DA Thomas Spota under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted state-law malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; this appeal followed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Lato caused a Fourth Amendment violation by preparing the warrant and participating in the search	Lato drafted warrant materials and orchestrated an unreasonable, unsupported search lacking probable cause	Magistrate found probable cause based on SPCA witness statements; Lato’s actions were supported by those materials and he properly aided execution	No Fourth Amendment violation: magistrate had substantial basis for probable cause; Lato’s participation was permissible
Whether omissions/misrepresentations in warrant materials vitiated probable cause	Omitted/misstated facts rendered the warrant materials defective and the magistrate’s finding unreliable	Plaintiff must show any faulty information was necessary to the probable-cause finding; alleged omissions were unsupported or immaterial	Omissions not shown to be necessary to probable cause; claim fails
Whether supervisory liability attaches to Spota under § 1983	Spota was aware of or ratified conduct, so liable as supervisor	No underlying constitutional violation occurred, so supervisor liability cannot stand	Dismissed: supervisor liability requires underlying deprivation, which is absent
Whether New York malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims are viable	Indictment arose from bad faith, suppressed/misrepresented evidence, and collateral objectives; reversal of conviction shows lack of probable cause	Grand jury indictment creates presumptive probable cause; plaintiff must prove grand jury misconduct or police bad faith; no evidence shown of such misconduct or improper grand jury presentation	Malicious prosecution dismissed (presumption not rebutted); abuse of process dismissed (no collateral objective shown)

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.) (magistrate’s probable-cause finding merits substantial deference)
United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir.) (challenge to probable-cause determination; faulty information must be necessary to finding)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (U.S. Supreme Court) (magistrate needs substantial basis for probable cause)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (U.S. Supreme Court) (objective reasonableness governs Fourth Amendment inquiry; subjective intent generally irrelevant)
United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235 (2d Cir.) (Fourth Amendment does not generally incorporate local regulatory restrictions)
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (U.S. Supreme Court) (third parties may directly aid execution of a warrant in certain circumstances)
Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.) (elements for malicious prosecution under New York law)
Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d 368 (2d Cir.) (indictment creates presumption of probable cause; rebuttable only by police misconduct)
Colon v. City of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y.) (discussion of circumstances that can rebut presumption of probable cause from indictment)
Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.) (elements of New York abuse of process claim)