Slip Opinion
N.D.N.Y.2020Background:
- Kampfer was appointed by the Mayfield Town Board on July 11, 2017 to replace the town Dog Control Officer who resigned effective August 11, 2017; the Board members say the appointment was to run only to December 31, 2017 (the remainder of the prior term); Kampfer contends he believed the appointment was permanent.
- An oath of office submitted to the court lists Kampfer’s appointment dates as 8/11/17–12/31/17; Kampfer says those dates were not on the form when he signed it. He refused to sign a later independent contractor agreement that explicitly covered July–December 2017.
- In August 2017 Kampfer attended an executive session where the Board criticized his letter to residents and asked him to limit travel reimbursements; he also alleges he filed a complaint with the New York Attorney General about the Board’s request to sign the contractor agreement (no proof the AG acted or that the Board was notified).
- The Board voted in executive session on December 12, 2017 not to reappoint Kampfer and informed him by letter that his appointment would end on December 31, 2017; he was paid for the period worked and returned town equipment.
- Kampfer sued individual Board members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (procedural and substantive due process, First Amendment retaliation, Seventh and Eighth Amendment theories) on January 2, 2018; the District Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint on February 25, 2020.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural due process: Did Kampfer have a property interest in continued employment or in a written appointment? | Kampfer argues he had a right to continued appointment (and a written appointment) because he was selected and began serving as Dog Control Officer. | Defendants argue no statutory or contractual property interest existed; appointments were annual and Kampfer refused the written contract. | No property interest; no entitlement to hearing or written appointment; summary judgment for Defendants. |
| Substantive due process: Were Defendants’ actions conscience-shocking? | Kampfer contends deprivation of his position violated substantive due process. | Defendants contend there was no protected property interest, and their conduct was not arbitrary or conscience-shocking. | Claim fails: no cognizable substantive due process right in this context; action not conscience-shocking. |
| First Amendment retaliation: Did Kampfer engage in protected speech and was non-reappointment retaliatory? | Kampfer says his complaint to the AG about the alleged illegal contractor agreement was protected speech and caused the Board not to reappoint him. | Defendants say his speech was either not a public‑concern speech or they lacked knowledge of it; in any event no causal link. | No causation shown (no evidence Board knew of AG complaint; timing alone insufficient); also not shown to be matter of public concern; summary judgment for Defendants. |
| Seventh & Eighth Amendment claims: Are these independent bases for relief? | Kampfer invokes the Seventh (jury) and Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment) Amendments as additional grounds. | Defendants note the Seventh Amendment preserves jury trial rights but is not an independent §1983 cause; the Eighth applies only to convicted persons. | Dismissed: Seventh not a standalone §1983 claim; Eighth inapplicable to non‑convicted plaintiff. |
Key Cases Cited
- Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no property interest where appointment terminated on fixed date and renewal not guaranteed)
- S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1988) (public‑employment property interest arises from statute or contract)
- Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (legitimate claim of entitlement required for property interest)
- Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (distinguishes public‑employee speech when speaking as citizen on matters of public concern)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (defines "public concern" in First Amendment employment context)
- Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (defendant may show it would have taken same action absent protected speech)
- Okin v. Village of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009) (substantive due process requires conduct that shocks the conscience)