Kaliscia Elonda Millsap v. State, 07-16-00455-CR

Millsap, a former City of Amarillo Community Development Department employee, was fired and was upset about coworkers allegedly bad-mouthing her.
On Feb 22–23, 2016 Millsap called coworker Amy Dixon, was angry, said she was “from California” and “carry a gun at all times,” and Dixon testified she felt nervous and scared.
On Mar 1, 2016 Millsap encountered coworker Michelle Martinez at a convenience store, told Martinez she carried a gun, said she would shoot people if she felt threatened, and displayed a handgun from a makeup bag.
Martinez reported the encounter to the CDD office; other employees (including Angelina Martinez and Vanessa Morales) became scared.
Millsap was charged by information with three counts of terroristic threat under Tex. Penal Code §22.07(a)(2) (counts named different victims); the State later waived Count Three.
At bench trial the court found Millsap guilty; on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged on two points: that the statements were conditional (thus legally insufficient) and not imminent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Millsap)	Held
Whether statements were conditional and thus insufficient as terroristic threats	Two statements were unconditional; the third, even if conditional, was legally sufficient because conditioning does not negate imminence or culpability	Statements were conditional (e.g., “if I feel threatened I will shoot”) and therefore insufficient	Court upheld conviction: statements were threats; conditioning (where present) did not defeat sufficiency
Whether threats were "imminent" as required by §22.07(a)(2)	Imminence means "near at hand" not necessarily immediate; context, display of gun, and victims’ reactions supported that victims feared imminent serious bodily injury	Millsap argued lack of immediacy and confused imminence with the perpetrator’s immediate ability to carry out the threat	Court affirmed: threats were imminent for purposes of the statute given surrounding circumstances and victims’ fear

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency review under due process)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discusses Jackson sufficiency standard in Texas)
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (hypothetically correct jury charge for sufficiency review)
Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997) (conditioning a threat does not necessarily preclude imminence)
Heinert v. Wichita Falls Hous. Auth., 441 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014) (definition of threat and imminence in terroristic-threat context)
Gillette v. State, 444 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014) (terroristic-threat is conduct-oriented; how threats may be communicated)
Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (analysis of imminence and victim’s perception)
Ramos v. State, 407 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (jury charge and materiality/variance principles)