Kaley v. United States
134 S. Ct. 1090
| SCOTUS | 2014Background
- Kerri and Brian Kaley were indicted on charges for reselling allegedly stolen medical devices and money laundering; the indictment alleged certain assets (including a $500,000 CD) were forfeitable.
- The Government obtained a pre-trial restraining order under 21 U.S.C. §853(e)(1) to freeze assets alleged to be forfeitable, blocking the Kaleys from using those funds to pay chosen counsel.
- The Kaleys sought to vacate the restraint and requested a hearing to contest the legality of the seizure; they wished to challenge the grand jury’s probable-cause finding that they committed the charged crimes (not the traceability of the assets).
- Lower courts divided on whether an indicted defendant may relitigate a grand jury’s probable-cause determination at a §853(e)(1) asset-restraint hearing; the Eleventh Circuit held such relitigation is not permitted.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split and held that an indicted defendant has no constitutional right to contest a grand jury’s probable-cause finding at a pre-trial asset-restraint hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an indicted defendant may contest the grand jury’s probable-cause finding (that the defendant committed the charged crimes) in a §853(e)(1) pretrial asset-restraint hearing | Kaley: due process and Sixth Amendment (right to chosen counsel) require a judicial hearing to relitigate probable cause so they can use frozen assets to hire counsel | U.S.: grand jury probable-cause findings are historically conclusive; relitigation would undermine grand jury role and burden government interests in preserving forfeitable assets | Court: No constitutional right to relitigate grand jury’s probable-cause finding at such a hearing; grand jury determination is conclusive |
| Whether Mathews v. Eldridge balancing requires an adversary hearing to contest the grand jury finding before freezing assets needed for counsel | Kaley: Mathews balancing favors defendant because loss of counsel choice is weighty and hearing would prevent erroneous deprivation | U.S.: even if Mathews applies, the balancing weighs against a new hearing because the incremental value of relitigation is slight and the hearing would impose real burdens (disclosure, witness safety, resource cost) | Court: Even under Mathews, the probable value of relitigation is too small to require the hearing; Monsanto and precedent control |
| Whether a defendant may challenge traceability of assets to alleged crime at a §853(e)(1) hearing | Kaley: they sought to challenge primarily the indictment, not traceability (but courts generally permit traceability challenges) | U.S.: traceability challenges are permissible and routinely addressed; distinction between traceability and indictment validity is important | Court: Lower courts correctly allow contesting traceability, but not relitigation of grand jury probable cause for the crimes charged |
| Whether allowing judicial relitigation would create harmful legal inconsistencies | Kaley: judicial hearing would just test the government’s showing and protect rights without necessarily contradicting the grand jury | U.S.: relitigation risks conflicting findings (judge vs grand jury), undermining grand jury role and incentivizing premature disclosure or strategic prosecutorial choices | Court: Such conflict and attendant harms counseled against recognizing a right to relitigate grand jury findings |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) (approved pretrial asset restraints under §853(e) where probable cause exists that property will be forfeitable)
- Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s money to hire counsel; post-conviction forfeiture may bar use of proceeds to pay attorneys)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (an indictment by a properly constituted grand jury conclusively determines probable cause to prosecute)
- United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (grand jury proceedings may proceed on the prosecutor’s one-sided presentation; challenges to grand jury evidence reliability are generally not entertained)
- Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (court may not look into and revise the judgment of the grand jury on sufficiency of evidence)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (established three‑part balancing test for determining what process is due)
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (holding that wrongful deprivation of counsel of choice is structural error)
