Kalergis v. Virginia Comm'r of Highways
2017 Va. LEXIS 151
Va.2017Background
- In 1994 VDOT acquired 26.01 acres of the Kalergis' 55-acre farm (land + improvements) by advanced acquisition for $1,150,000; the purchase documents and deed list that total as the purchase price.
- A 1993 appraisal separately valued the land at $286,110 and the improvements at $863,890 (total $1,150,000).
- The owner later repurchased the improvements in 1997 for $30,000, but the improvements were removed/demolished and could not be relocated.
- Under Va. Code § 33.2-1005(A), if a VDOT project has not commenced within 20 years, the Commonwealth must reconvey acquired property "upon repayment of the original purchase price." Kalergis demanded reconveyance of the land for $286,110 (the appraisal land value).
- VDOT offered reconveyance for the original $1,150,000 per § 33.2-1005(A) or current fair market value under § 33.2-1005(B); Kalergis sued seeking specific performance to reconvey the land for $286,110.
- The circuit court sustained VDOT’s demurrer; the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding "original purchase price" unambiguously meant the $1,150,000 paid at acquisition and did not permit inserting the appraisal land-only value.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What price governs reconveyance under Va. Code § 33.2-1005(A)? | "Original purchase price" should mean the price attributable to the portion of property being returned (land-only $286,110 based on appraisal). | "Original purchase price" means the amount actually paid to the owner at acquisition (the $1,150,000 listed in offer and deed); appraisal value is different. | Court held the phrase is unambiguous: reconveyance price is the original purchase price paid ($1,150,000); appraisal value is not synonymous and cannot replace it. |
Key Cases Cited
- Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188 (review of demurrer is de novo)
- Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Windsor Indus., 272 Va. 64 (purpose of § 33.1-90/33.2-1005(A) to reconvey unused advance acquisitions for the original purchase price)
- Payne v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 288 Va. 432 (statutory language controls when unambiguous)
- Board of Supervisors of James City Cnty. v. Windmill Meadows, LLC, 287 Va. 170 (courts must give effect to clear legislative language)
- City of Richmond v. VEPCO, 292 Va. 70 (different statutory language implies different legislative intent)
- McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 (doctrine of judicial restraint; decide on narrowest grounds)
- Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (judicial restraint—decide on narrowest grounds available)