Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc.
2013 Alas. LEXIS 99
| Alaska | 2013Background
- Jack Morrell spent 2–4 hours drinking at Chilkoot Charlie's on Feb. 2004 and consumed most or all of his alcohol there; he admitted drinking no alcohol before or after the bar visit.
- About 45 minutes after leaving the bar Morrell was involved in a confrontation at a Taco Bell and fatally stabbed Eric Kalenka; witnesses and police at the scene observed slurred speech, stumbling, uncooperativeness, and a strong odor of alcohol.
- Toxicology evidence extrapolated Morrell's BAC around the time of the stabbing to as high as 0.27 and estimated he had consumed between roughly 7.5 and 19 drinks.
- The Kalenka Estate sued Chilkoot Charlie's under Alaska dram‑shop law, alleging the bar served alcohol to a statutorily defined "drunken person."
- At summary judgment the Estate submitted an expert report (Trendowski) opining that Morrell likely exhibited visible signs of intoxication while on the premises; the superior court found the report too speculative and granted summary judgment for the bar.
- The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding the circumstantial evidence (steady drinking at the bar, no alcohol before/after, high BAC shortly after, and observable intoxication soon after leaving) was sufficient to create a genuine issue for the jury about visible intoxication at the time of service.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Estate raised a genuine issue that Morrell was a "drunken person" when served at Chilkoot Charlie's | Circumstantial proof (duration and amount of drinking at bar, no drinking before/after, high BAC and visible intoxication within ~45 minutes) supports reasonable inference he was visibly impaired when served | No direct eyewitness of intoxication at the bar; expert opinion is speculative and cannot bridge the gap — insufficient to show the outward manifestations were plain and easily observed by servers | Reversed summary judgment: evidence met Alaska's low threshold to create a genuine factual dispute for jury about visible intoxication at time of service |
| Admissibility/weight of expert reliance on hearsay and unsigned report | Trendowski reasonably relied on police/criminal-trial testimony and toxicology; expert reliance on such data is permissible and absence of timely objection waives exclusion | Report speculative and unsworn; challenges to admissibility make it unreliable | Court considered the expert report on the merits because defendant did not timely preserve objections; expert reliance on otherwise inadmissible facts can be allowed for opinion formation |
| Whether the patron's subsequent violent act was a superseding cause absolving the bar | Service to a drunken person can be a proximate cause even when patron later acts violently; issue for jury | The stabbing was an independent intervening act breaking causal chain | Court did not foreclose causation jury question; summary judgment on superseding‑cause grounds was inappropriate |
| Proper legal standard for "drunken person" under dram‑shop immunity | A drunken person is substantially impaired with outward manifestations that are plain and easily observed; circumstantial evidence shortly before/after service can be probative | Emphasized need for observable outward manifestations at time of service, not merely intoxication shown later | Court reiterated statutory standard and held circumstantial evidence of visible intoxication soon after service can support inference the manifestations existed at time of service |
Key Cases Cited
- Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, 694 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1985) (condition shortly before/after bar visit is circumstantially relevant to condition at bar)
- Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1994) (discusses dram‑shop statutory definition of "drunken person")
- Smith v. Shagnasty's, 688 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 2004) (one beer served shortly before visibly intoxicated condition can permit inference of obvious intoxication at time of service)
- Fairbanks v. J.B. McLoughlin Co., 929 P.2d 433 (Wash. 1997) (off‑premises observation shortly after service may create inference of obvious intoxication at time of service when no intervening consumption)
- Reed v. Breton, 718 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. 2006) (contrasting authority: circumstantial proof of later intoxication may be insufficient where eyewitnesses at bar testified otherwise)