Kaiser v. CSL Plasma Inc.
240 F. Supp. 3d 1129
| W.D. Wash. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff (Kaiser) sued CSL Plasma alleging transgender discrimination under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) and a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim after being deferred from donating plasma.
- Case removed to federal court, remanded for insufficient amount-in-controversy, then later removed again; parties purported to settle in 2016 but Plaintiff moved to reopen when settlement was not perfected.
- Defendant asserted defenses including that the case had settled, failure to state a claim, preemption by federal law/FDA, primary jurisdiction of the FDA, and that the CPA claim is exempt because FDA regulates plasma donation.
- Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the settlement defense and the affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim, preemption, and primary jurisdiction.
- The parties stipulated that material facts relevant to the motion were not in dispute; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on legal issues.
- The Court denied CSL’s motions on these issues and granted Plaintiff’s motion, dismissing the listed defenses with prejudice and rejecting CSL’s request for summary judgment on them.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the case was settled | Kaiser: no enforceable settlement was reached | CSL: case settled and should be dismissed | Court: no enforceable settlement; CSL defense dismissed |
| Whether "failure to state a claim" is a valid affirmative defense | Kaiser: not a proper affirmative defense; should be dismissed | CSL: pleaded it as a defense (no opposing brief) | Court: dismisses defense as improper pleading (not an affirmative defense) |
| Whether WLAD/CPA claims are preempted by federal law/FDA | Kaiser: no conflict; WLAD only bars gender-identity‑based deferrals, not risk-based screening | CSL: FDA regs/guidance governing donor eligibility conflict with state law and preempt it | Court: rejects implied conflict preemption; no federal regulation requires wholesale rejection of transgender donors; defense dismissed |
| Whether primary jurisdiction requires referral to FDA | Kaiser: FDA expertise not required; legal/factual issues for the court/jury | CSL: FDA has primary jurisdiction over donor eligibility and related technical questions | Court: doctrine not applicable; issues are not ones Congress committed to FDA or that require its expertise; defense dismissed |
| Whether CPA claim is exempt because FDA regulates plasma donation (RCW 19.86.170) | Kaiser: exemption applies only where the specific challenged practice is "specifically permitted, prohibited, or regulated" by the regulator; CSL points to no regulation requiring gender‑identity deferrals | CSL: FDA regulates plasma donation; CPA claim should be barred by statutory exemption | Court: denies summary judgment for CSL; no specific FDA rule permits the alleged discriminatory practice, so CPA claim survives |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (establishes summary judgment standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (movant’s burden at summary judgment)
- Wyshak v. City Nat., 607 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.) (fair‑notice standard for pleading affirmative defenses)
- Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (preemption is governed by congressional intent)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (express and implied preemption principles)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (agency pronouncements and preemption; presumption against preemption in traditional state fields)
- Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (local regulation of blood/plasma requirements not necessarily preempted)
- Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753 (9th Cir.) (primary jurisdiction doctrine and factors to consider)