Kagan v. Selene Finance L.P., 210 F. Supp. 3d 535

Plaintiff Helen Sue Kagan, a homeowner, alleges Selene Finance (a special servicer and debt collector) attempted to collect a residential mortgage debt in default.
Selene sent multiple letters (Sept–Oct 2014), including a written debt-validation "Notice," which stated (inter alia) that the consumer "may dispute the validity of the debt in writing" and provided a phone number.
Months later (June 2015) Selene left several voicemail messages that identified the company and phone number but did not state that the caller was a "debt collector" or otherwise reference the debt.
Kagan sued under the FDCPA, alleging (1) the Notice misled consumers into thinking disputes must be written (violating §1692g and §1692e(10)), and (2) the voicemails failed to disclose the caller was a debt collector (violating §1692e(11)).
Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court evaluated the pleadings and attached exhibits and applied the least-sophisticated-consumer standard.
Ruling: the court dismissed the claim about the Notice but denied dismissal of the voicemail claim, finding a plausible §1692e(11) violation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the written Notice violated §1692g/§1692e(10) by implying disputes must be written	Notice language ("may dispute ... in writing") implies writing is required; that misstates rights and could mislead least sophisticated consumer	Notice reasonably conveys an option to dispute in writing; it tracks statutory substance and provides a phone number, so oral disputes are available	Dismissed — court held the phrasing conveys an option (not a requirement) and complies with FDCPA validation requirements
Whether voicemail messages violated §1692e(11) by failing to disclose the caller was a debt collector	Voicemails did not identify callers as debt collectors and gave no hint of collection purpose; omission is material and violates §1692e(11)	Voicemails used company name and followed prior letters that identified Selene as a debt collector, so the messages would be understood; omission (if any) is immaterial	Denied dismissal — court found omission could be material and plausibly state a §1692e(11) claim given the time gap and lack of debt-related content in messages

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state plausible claim)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for complaints)
Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118 (FDCPA purpose and context)
Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229 (strict liability under FDCPA; deceptive notices)
Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C., 591 F.3d 130 (least sophisticated consumer standard explained)
Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (apply least-sophisticated-consumer test to validation notices)
Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (overshadowing/contradiction analysis for validation notices)
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (limits on bizarre interpretations under least-sophisticated-consumer test)
Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292 (validation notice timing and content under §1692g)
Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60 (use of least-sophisticated-consumer standard for §1692e)
Emanuel v. Am. Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805 (debt-collector identification need not be verbatim statutory language)
Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097 (validation notice violates §1692g only when it expressly requires dispute in writing)