446 F.Supp.3d 1
M.D.N.C.2020Background
- North Carolina’s State Health Plan (NCSHP) contains a categorical Exclusion denying coverage for treatment "in conjunction with proposed gender transformation" or "sex changes or modifications."
- Plaintiffs are current/former employees of UNC/NC State/UNCG or their dependents; they are transgender or parents of transgender minors with diagnosed gender dysphoria and allege medically necessary transition-related care is denied under the Exclusion.
- Plaintiffs sued: (1) State Treasurer Dale Folwell and Executive Administrator Dee Jones (official-capacity) under the Equal Protection Clause; (2) University employers under Title IX; and (3) NCSHP under Section 1557 of the ACA. Relief sought includes declaratory, injunctive relief, and damages.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (6), and (7), arguing (inter alia) lack of standing/traceability, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for the ACA claim, failure to state Title IX/Equal Protection claims, and necessary-party nonjoinder.
- The court found Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded Article III standing and statutory causes of action, concluded Section 1557 is actionable notwithstanding sovereign-immunity arguments (via CRREA reasoning), found the Exclusion facially discriminates on the basis of sex triggering heightened scrutiny, and denied motions to dismiss and the requested stay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title IX viability / standing and zone of interests | Plaintiffs: universities offered/participated in the Plan so their hiring/enrollment links the universities to the harm; dependents and parents are within Title IX’s broad ‘person’ protection. | University Defs: Plan terms set by state actors so universities lack traceability and cannot redress; parents/minors fall outside Title IX’s zone. | Court: At pleading stage traceability and redress are plausibly alleged; minor and parent plaintiffs fall within Title IX’s wide scope; Title IX claim survives. |
| Section 1557 (ACA) sovereign immunity waiver | Plaintiffs: §1557 prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally funded health programs; read with CRREA, states waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. | State Defs: §1557 does not explicitly waive immunity and does not reference gender identity; CRREA catch-all shouldn’t reach §1557. | Court: §1557 is sufficiently like statutes named in CRREA and, together with CRREA, plausibly effects waiver; ACA claim survives. |
| Equal Protection (Fourteenth Amendment) | Plaintiffs: Exclusion expressly targets treatment tied to gender/sex and treats natal sexes differently; classification triggers heightened scrutiny. | State Defs: Exclusion targets medical diagnoses, not gender; savings justify exclusion. | Court: Exclusion facially discriminates on sex and tethering to sex stereotypes; heightened scrutiny applies and the State’s proffered justification (cost savings) is insufficient at pleading stage; claim survives. |
| Request to stay pending Supreme Court decision and joinder | Plaintiffs: delay causes ongoing harm (denial of medically necessary care); Board of Trustees not required to afford complete relief. | Defendants: stay warranted because Harris Funeral Homes may control; Plan Board is a required party under Rule 19. | Court: Declined stay (delay harms plaintiffs, no clear & convincing reason); Board’s joinder not required to accord complete relief; case proceeds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (sex stereotyping can constitute discrimination "because of sex")
- EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (applied Price Waterhouse to transgender status discrimination)
- Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (upheld challenge to state-plan exclusion for gender-confirming care)
- G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (Title IX framework and elements)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III standing requirements)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing principle; pleading-stage burdens)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (limits on proximate causation in standing; "fairly traceable" explained)
- Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (CRREA waives state immunity when liability is "unmistakably clear")
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (states cannot accept conditions of which they are unaware; notice in waiver context)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (demanding "exceedingly persuasive justification" for sex-based classifications)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (standard for rational-basis review vs. heightened scrutiny)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
