Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23634

Kaczmarek was convicted of murder in Illinois in 1996 and sentenced to natural life based on a judge's finding that the murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous.
The maximum statutory murder sentence at the time was 40 years, with possible life denial if the brutal-and-heinous enhancement applied under 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b).
The district court adjudicated Kaczmarek’s habeas petition under AEDPA and granted relief on Apprendi grounds, but denied other claims; the court later denied relief after reconsideration.
The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the natural-life sentence, applying plain-error review and concluding the Apprendi violation was not prejudicial because the conduct qualified under any definition of brutality and cruelty.
Kaczmarek argued that Apprendi requires jury determination of the underlying facts and that his indictment failed to charge those aggravating facts; the state argued waiver and procedural-default defenses, which the district and appellate courts analyzed under AEDPA standards.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural default of Apprendi claim	Kaczmarek asserts Illinois defaulted the Apprendi issue via waiver.	State contends waiver was adequate and independent ground for default.	Procedural default applies; Apprendi claim defaulted
Whether cause and prejudice or miscarriage-of-justice exceptions save the default	Kaczmarek could show cause due to Apprendi novelty or prejudice.	State argues no valid cause or prejudice; Apprendi issue not saved.	No cause or prejudice shown; default not saved
Indictment/notice issue under Apprendi	Aggravating facts increasing maximum penalty must be charged or notice provided.	State contends Apprendi limits to federal prosecutions; state indictment not required for state cases.	Claim meritless; Apprendi does not require charging in state indictments

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (any fact increasing maximum penalty must be jury-determined)
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (U.S. 1999) (indictment-jury relationship for federal cases)
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (U.S. 2002) (federal prosecutions require indictment charging antecedent facts)
People v. Crespo, 203 Ill.2d 335 (Ill. 2001) (Illinois plain-error review and Apprendi application)
People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167 (Ill. 2005) (plain-error standard discussed in Crespo clarified)
People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 1995) (contemporaneous objection rules in Illinois)
People v. Hampton, 149 Ill.2d 71 (Ill. 1992) (contemporaneous objection and waiver doctrine in Illinois)
People v. Guest, 115 Ill.2d 72 (Ill. 1986) (contemporaneous objection rule groundwork)
People v. Devin, 93 Ill.2d 326 (Ill. 1982) (basic waiver/forfeiture framework)
Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (factors supporting implicit waiver and procedural default analysis)
Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000) (procedure-default timing on appeal)
Gray v. Hardy, 598 F.3d 324 (7th Cir. 2010) (Illinois waiver doctrine as independent and adequate ground)
Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2009) (AEDPA independent-and-adequate grounds for default analysis)