Kachalsky v. Cacace
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837
S.D.N.Y.2011Background
- This case challenges NYPL 400.00(2)(f) (concealed-carry license) as applied to Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights under Heller/McDonald.
- New York’s handgun licensing scheme bans possession generally but allows licenses under specific exemptions; 400.00(2)(f) governs concealed-carry licenses with a “proper cause” requirement.
- Applications for full-carry permits are processed locally by Westchester County agencies; licensing officers have discretion to grant or deny.
- Individual Plaintiffs (Kachalsky, Nikolov, Nance, Marcucci-Nance, Detmer) applied for full-carry permits and were denied; SAF seeks to represent supporters nationwide but its standing is challenged.
- Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action in July 2010, amended in November 2010; Defendants move to dismiss and plaintiffs move for summary judgment; the court addresses standing, ripeness, abstention, res judicata, and the statute’s constitutionality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Plaintiffs have standing and the case is ripe | Individual Plaintiffs have standing because their permit denials constitute concrete injuries. | Defendants contend injuries are speculative without post-McDonald denials or appeals. | Plaintiffs have standing and their claims are ripe. |
| Whether the County is a proper party under §1983 | County’s role in investigations creates liability for resulting denials. | County is not a proper party since licensing officers make final determinations. | Court assumes County may be proper; proceeds on merits against State Defendants. |
| Whether Rooker-Feldman bars the claims | N/A (not pressed as a basis to bar relief) | N/A | Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claims. |
| Whether Section 400.00(2)(f) violates the Second Amendment (facial/as-applied) | McDonald/Heller extend Second Amendment to states; improper-cause restriction is unconstitutional as applied. | Statute falls outside core home-defense right; may be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny. | Section 400.00(2)(f) is constitutional as applied under intermediate scrutiny; facial challenge rejected. |
| What level of scrutiny applies to §400.00(2)(f) and its relation to Heller | Strict scrutiny should apply due to fundamental right. | Intermediate scrutiny appropriate given scope and nature of regulation. | Court adopts intermediate scrutiny; statute satisfies substantial relation to public-safety interests. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2008) (held an individual right to keep and bear arms exists; but not all gun regulations are invalidated; home self-defense focus)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2010) (incorporated Second Amendment to apply to the states)
- Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005) (NY handgun licensing scheme does not infringe Second Amendment as applied to states)
- Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (license-denial injuries constitute Article III injury; standing from permit denial)
- Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (intermediate scrutiny applied to concealed-carry permit requirements; substantial relation to public safety)
- Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (post-McDonald standing and permit-denial injury analysis supports Article III injury)
- Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009) (discussed strict scrutiny vs. intermediate in Second Amendment context)
- Heller v. City of Chicago (McDonald context), 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (connects Second Amendment core to home self-defense and limits on regulation)