K.W. v. Indiana Department of Child Services
12 N.E.3d 241
| Ind. | 2014Background
- The State sought to terminate the parental rights of C.C. and KW's father for KW's CHINS/TPR history.
- On the termination hearing day, C.C. was incarcerated; her counsel sought a continuance to await release, which the trial court denied.
- The TPR hearing proceeded in C.C.'s absence, resulting in a termination order as to C.C. and KW's father.
- C.C. appealed: denial of continuance violated due process; ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing transport or telephonic participation.
- Indiana appellate review vacated the Court of Appeals, addressing only the continuance denial; the court concluded the denial was an abuse of discretion.
- Court applied and weighed factors related to incarcerated parental attendance and participation, emphasizing the right to be heard meaningfully.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion denying a continuance? | C.C. shows good cause to attend post-release. | Court may balance interests; delay would be minimal. | Yes, abuse of discretion; denial prejudiced C.C.'s due process rights. |
| Should the In re C.G. factors govern a continuance when incarceration is involved? | Factors guide whether incarcerated parent can attend. | In re C.G. test applies to transport, not continuation. | Factors helpful for review; not all applied, but supports reversal. |
| Does a parent's absence at a termination hearing violate due process when alternative participation is available? | Parent should be heard; alternatives should be considered. | No absolute right to present in person; other considerations exist. | Untimely absence without meaningful participation violates due process. |
| Was the prejudice standard satisfied to uphold an abuse finding of denial of continuance? | Prejudice can be shown by missing the parent's testimony. | Prejudice should be assessed narrowly under harmless error. | Prejudice supported by lack of meaningful participation; reversal warranted. |
| Should the 180-day statutory deadline affect disposition when continuances occur and incarceration is involved? | Deadline could be implicated; dismissal without prejudice possible. | Motion to dismiss unlikely; multiple continuances occurred; accountability shared. | Not controlling; deadline not weighed against C.C.; best viewed in context of due process. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910 (Ind.2011) (guides balancing factors for incarcerated parent attendance at TPR hearings)
- Tillotson v. Clay Cnty. Dept. of Family & Children, 777 N.E.2d 741 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (advocates alternative participation methods for incarcerated parents)
- Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (abuse of discretion standard for continuances; prejudice requirement)
- Hawkins v. State, 982 N.E.2d 997 (Ind.2013) (presence requirement and meaningful opportunity to be heard)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (due process in termination of parental rights)
- Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581 (Ind.2001) (concept of substantial due process in parental rights cases)
- Tillotson v. Clay Cnty. Dept. of Family & Children, 777 N.E.2d 741 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (full consideration of alternatives to physical presence)
