K.M. Alston, Jr. v. PA BPP
1924 and 2042 C.D. 2014
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Nov 28, 2016Background
- Kevan M. Alston, Jr. was originally sentenced in 1998 to 10–20 years, paroled in Jan 2010, and subsequently recommitted after parole violations and new criminal charges.
- While on parole he faced DUI (Feb 13, 2013), then was arrested for simple assault and resisting arrest (Apr 15, 2013); he pled nolo contendere/pleaded guilty to the assault and resisting charges on Sept 20, 2013.
- The Board recommitted Alston as a convicted parole violator (CPV) and imposed 18 months backtime (within the combined presumptive ranges) and denied credit for time at liberty on parole; the Board later issued a recalculated maximum date.
- Alston filed administrative appeals and mandamus actions alleging (1) improper forfeiture of parole-time credit and erroneous recalculation of his maximum date, and (2) due process violations from delays and deficient certified records.
- This Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing, retained jurisdiction, and the Board recalculated Alston’s maximum date to June 12, 2020 (crediting 61 days for Feb 13–Apr 15, 2013 but denying credit for the absconding period Apr 15–Sept 3, 2013).
- The Court affirms the Board’s revocation/recommitment and denial of parole-time credit, agrees with the June 12, 2020 maximum date, vacates the prior May 18, 2020 date, and remands for the Board to enter the corrected date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 months backtime as a CPV was improper | Alston contended the recommitment/backtime was erroneous | Board argued 18 months is within combined presumptive ranges under regulation | Held: 18 months is within presumptive range and not subject to challenge (affirmed) |
| Whether Board improperly forfeited credit for time at liberty on parole and miscalculated maximum date | Alston argued the Board relied on DUI or otherwise failed to credit 285 days at liberty | Board said recalculation was based on assault/resisting conviction (CPV) and properly denied parole-time credit under §6138(a) | Held: Recalculation based on admitted assault/resisting conviction was proper; forfeiture authorized and recalculation to June 12, 2020 is correct |
| Whether pre-conviction custody (Feb 13–Apr 15, 2013) should be credited | Alston asserted more credit was due | Board credited 61 days as custody solely on Board warrant, then noted release/absconding cut off further credit | Held: 61 days credited; no credit for period Alston absconded (Apr 15–Sept 3, 2013) |
| Whether Board’s delays and deficient certified record violated due process | Alston claimed delay in administrative responses and record deficiencies prejudiced his appeals and constitutional rights | Board argued no statutory time limit; prior precedent shows delay alone does not violate due process absent actual prejudice | Held: No due process violation — Alston failed to show actual prejudice from delays or record issues; remedy for delay is mandamus to force decision, not reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 574 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1990) (recommitment within presumptive range is not challengeable)
- Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 412 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1980) (forfeiture of parole-time credit for CPV is permissible)
- Martin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 840 A.2d 299 (Pa. 2003) (pretrial custody credit rules where parolee held on Board warrant)
- Slotcavage v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 745 A.2d 89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (Board delay in issuing decision does not automatically violate due process absent prejudice; mandamus remedy)
- Glass v. Commonwealth, 586 A.2d 369 (Pa. 1991) (prejudice must be shown to establish due process violation from delay)
- Sanders v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 651 A.2d 663 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (absence of statutory time frame for Board decisions limits relief for delay)
- Goods v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 912 A.2d 226 (Pa. 2006) (parole revocation appeals follow two-tier administrative process)
