107 A.3d 658
N.H.2014Background
- In 1999 Pelham adopted an impact fee ordinance (pursuant to RSA 674:16 and RSA 674:21) requiring developers to pay fees to fund capital improvements and providing that unencumbered fees not spent within six years could be "refunded" to current property owners.
- Petitioners (developers who paid impact fees and later sold the properties) sought declaratory judgment and mandamus in 2012 for refunds of fees paid more than six years earlier, arguing the Town unlawfully spent fees on pre-construction activities and that refunds must go to the original payors.
- The Town defended its ordinance as within statutory authority and moved to dismiss, asserting the ordinance properly directs refunds to current property owners and that petitioners lacked standing because they no longer owned the properties.
- The superior court ruled the ordinance was not ultra vires: RSA 674:21, V(e) does not require refunds be paid to the original payor, and thus petitioners lacked standing to seek refunds.
- Petitioners appealed, arguing "refund" requires payment to the original payor or successor in interest and that the ordinance produced unequal treatment of developers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RSA 674:21, V(e) requires refunds of unencumbered impact fees to be paid to the original payor or successor in interest | "Refund" means to reimburse the original payor (or successor), so municipality must return fees to those who paid them | Statute does not specify recipient; municipality may lawfully direct refunds to current property owners under its ordinance | Court held "refund" does not compel payment to original payor; ordinance valid to pay refunds to current property owners |
| Whether Town ordinance directing refunds to current property owners is ultra vires under enabling statutes | Ordinance conflicts with statute by diverting refunds from original payors | Ordinance falls within authority granted by RSA 674:16 and RSA 674:21 and is not precluded by the refund provision | Court held ordinance was within the Town's delegated authority and not ultra vires |
| Whether silence/ambiguity in statute permits resort to legislative history to construe "refund" | Legislative history supports plaintiff's narrower meaning of "refund" | Any ambiguity favors reading the statute as not limiting the refund recipient; legislative history not needed if unambiguous | Court found term unambiguous in context and declined to consider legislative history |
| Whether petitioners had standing to seek refunds after selling properties | Petitioners entitled to refund as original payors or successors in interest | Petitioners lack standing because ordinance grants refund rights to current property owners, not prior payors | Court held petitioners lack standing and affirmed dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Avery v. N.H. Dep’t of Educ., 162 N.H. 604 (2011) (motion to dismiss and standing standards)
- EnergyNorth Natural Gas v. City of Concord, 164 N.H. 14 (2012) (statutory interpretation; review de novo)
- Upton v. Town of Hopkinton, 157 N.H. 115 (2008) (purpose of impact fees shifting capital costs to developers)
- Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 (2007) (municipal ordinances must conform to enabling legislation)
- Caparco v. Town of Danville, 152 N.H. 722 (2005) (use of common meaning and dictionary when statutory terms undefined)
- Appeal of Thermo-Fisher Scientific, 160 N.H. 670 (2010) (construing statutory language in context with associated sections)
- State v. Collyns, 166 N.H. (2014) (avoidance of superfluous statutory language)
- Dukette v. Brazas, 166 N.H. 252 (2014) (preservation required to raise constitutional claims on appeal)