220 A.3d 1167
Pa. Commw. Ct.2019Background
- Licensee (Diveglia) committed a first DUI (75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(a)(1)) on Feb. 27, 2016 and was accepted into ARD on Nov. 15, 2016.
- Three days after ARD acceptance, she committed a second DUI (75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(c)) on Nov. 18, 2016; ARD was later revoked.
- Licensee was convicted of the second DUI on Aug. 9, 2017; the Bureau suspended her license for 18 months upon receiving the certified conviction.
- Licensee was convicted of the first DUI on Mar. 2, 2018; the Bureau imposed a 12‑month suspension (the statute provides an exception to suspension for § 3802(a) first‑time offenders who have no "prior offense").
- Licensee appealed the 12‑month suspension; the trial court sustained the appeal, reasoning the first DUI was earlier in time and thus not a prior offense.
- The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that under Section 3806 the relevant inquiry looks to convictions/preliminary dispositions (timing of sentencing/ disposition), so the Aug. 9, 2017 conviction for the second DUI constituted a "prior offense" to the Mar. 2, 2018 conviction and the Bureau properly imposed suspension.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Diveglia had a "prior offense" for § 3804(e)(2)(iii) at time of her first DUI conviction | Diveglia: the first DUI occurred earlier in time (Feb. 2016), so she had no prior offense and qualifies for the no‑suspension exception | Bureau: "prior offense" is defined by Section 3806 using convictions/preliminary dispositions before sentencing; the second DUI was convicted before the first DUI conviction, so it is a prior offense | Court: Agreed with Bureau—prior‑offense inquiry depends on disposition/conviction timing; second DUI conviction (Aug. 9, 2017) was a prior offense to the first DUI conviction (Mar. 2, 2018) |
| Whether the Bureau must follow the criminal sentencing court’s characterization of offense order | Diveglia: sentencing court treated the first DUI as a prior offense when sentencing the second, so Bureau should not treat the reverse as true | Bureau: Bureau must apply the statutory definition in § 3806, regardless of how the criminal court characterized offenses for sentencing | Court: Rejected Diveglia’s argument; Bureau must apply the statutory definition and timing in § 3806 independently of criminal sentencing characterization |
Key Cases Cited
- Becker v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 186 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (sets out elements for § 3804(e)(2)(iii) no‑suspension exception)
- Middaugh v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 196 A.3d 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (discusses Vehicle Code civil license‑suspension consequences)
- Cesare v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 16 A.3d 545 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (explains standard of review for license suspension appeals)