K.c. And L.m., V Good Samaritan Hospital
48029-8
| Wash. Ct. App. | Feb 28, 2017Background
- KC and LM allege childhood sexual abuse by their stepfather (Johnson) and sued DSHS and later Good Samaritan Hospital (GSH) and counselors for negligent screening/monitoring and counseling failures. Abuse began in early childhood; Johnson died when the girls were teenagers.
- KC and LM originally sued DSHS in April 2013; Judge Stolz granted summary judgment to DSHS dismissing KC’s and LM’s claims as time-barred under RCW 4.16.340(1)(c); an appeal was filed then withdrawn after post-judgment proceedings.
- In November 2014 KC and LM amended to add GSH, Sheehy, and Williams; GSH moved for summary judgment arguing KC’s claims are collaterally estopped by Judge Stolz’s ruling and that both plaintiffs’ claims are barred by RCW 4.16.340(1)(c).
- At the 2015 GSH summary judgment hearing, Judge Hogan denied GSH’s collateral estoppel and statute-of-limitations dismissal motions, and granted KC/LM’s motion precluding GSH from asserting a statute-of-limitations affirmative defense at trial.
- GSH sought discretionary review of three rulings: (1) denial of collateral estoppel as to KC; (2) denial of dismissal of LM’s claims as time-barred; and (3) striking GSH’s statute-of-limitations affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collateral estoppel (KC) — whether Judge Stolz’s prior summary judgment precludes KC from relitigating that her claims are time-barred | KC: prior ruling is tainted by alleged bias and records/arguments differ; issue should not be preclusive | GSH: Judge Stolz’s summary judgment was a final merits ruling on the same issue and should preclude relitigation | Court: Denied collateral estoppel — although prior ruling met preclusion elements, applying it would produce injustice and conflict with legislative intent of RCW 4.16.340 (affording victims opportunity to show delayed discovery) |
| Statute of limitations (LM) — whether LM discovered causal link >3 years before filing, barring her claim | LM: records do not conclusively show she associated harms with abuse earlier; factual dispute for jury | GSH: medical records and diagnoses show LM linked her symptoms to abuse before the limitations window | Court: Denied GSH’s summary judgment as to LM — genuine disputes of material fact exist; accrual (discovery of causal link) is for the jury |
| Preclusion of statute-of-limitations affirmative defense — whether trial court properly barred GSH from asserting the defense | KC/LM: defense should be barred because discovery/accrual is established as a matter of law | GSH: accrual is disputed; defense must be preserved for trial | Court: Reversed trial court’s order striking the affirmative defense — accrual is a factual question and GSH may assert the defense at trial |
| Standard for accrual under RCW 4.16.340(1)(c) — when statute begins to run | Plaintiffs: accrual requires plaintiff’s subjective association of injury with abuse; delayed reaction covered | Defendants: objective records showing knowledge suffice to start limitations | Held: Statute begins when victim discovers the causal link between abuse and the injury claimed; whether discovery occurred is a question of fact for the jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72 (1986) (supreme court held three-year limitations period barred claim despite repressed memory, prompting legislative change)
- C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699 (1999) (RCW 4.16.340 applies to third-party negligence claims based on childhood sexual abuse)
- Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wn.2d 391 (2014) (summary judgment standard)
- Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299 (2004) (collateral estoppel standards and issues reviewed de novo)
- Korst v. McMahon, 136 Wn. App. 202 (2006) (evidence of ongoing pain did not prove plaintiff knew abuse caused later serious symptoms; accrual/discovery is factual)
- B.R. v. Horsley, 186 Wn. App. 294 (2015) (statute’s accrual focuses on when victim discovered causal link; question for jury)