719 F.Supp.3d 466
D. Md.2024Background
- Plaintiff, Justyna Jensen, a California resident, applied for Maryland’s social equity lottery to obtain a recreational cannabis retail license, but was denied for not meeting Maryland-specific criteria.
- Maryland law limits social equity eligibility partly to those who attended a Maryland-based institution with a high proportion of Pell Grant-eligible students, which Jensen did not.
- Jensen argued this provision unconstitutionally discriminates against out-of-state applicants under the dormant Commerce Clause.
- Jensen sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from issuing any licenses under the current regime while the case was pending.
- The Maryland Cannabis Administration and its director opposed, challenging standing, timeliness, applicability of the Commerce Clause, and the likelihood of harm.
- The motion was fully briefed and argued before the court, which denied Jensen's request for an injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing | Denial of eligibility was a concrete, redressable harm | No injury or redressability because other criteria not met | Plaintiff had standing |
| Irreparable Harm | Constitutional violation under dormant Commerce Clause | Not addressed as dispositive | Satisfied if constitutional violation likely |
| Balance of Equities & Public Interest | Injunction stops unconstitutional law, little harm to state | Plaintiff delayed, process underway, federal illegality an issue | Balance and public interest weighed against injunction |
| Applicability of Dormant Commerce Clause | Clause applies to cannabis market despite federal ban | Clause does not apply—federally illegal market | Dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to recreational cannabis |
| Likelihood of Success on the Merits | Maryland’s law facially discriminates against out-of-staters | Even if Clause applies, state’s structure is permissible | Plaintiff unlikely to succeed |
| Overbreadth of Requested Relief | Seeks broad invalidation of the entire statute | Relief should be limited to specific provision challenged | Relief sought is overbroad; entire statute won’t be invalidated |
| Injunction Pending Appeal | Sought to halt license issuance during appeal | Opposed under same standard as preliminary injunction | Denied for the same reasons as preliminary injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (sets the four-factor standard for preliminary injunctions)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (establishes federal authority over cannabis market under Commerce Clause)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
- Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (dormant Commerce Clause bars discriminatory state economic regulation)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (establishes Pike balancing test for non-discriminatory state regulations)
- Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (courts should sever unconstitutional portions of statutes)