Justin Wayne Shipp v. State
05-16-01347-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 16, 2017Background
- Justin Wayne Shipp was stopped after an MPD officer, Cpl. John Fuller, observed a pickup exit a parking lot at a high rate of speed around 1:00 a.m.; posted speed limit was 50 mph.
- Fuller attempted to use radar; the in-car unit briefly flashed "66" but he did not obtain a radar lock and ultimately estimated the truck's speed at 57–60 mph based on training and experience.
- Fuller also observed the truck turn into a parking lot; he initially believed the driver failed to signal but later, after reviewing his dash video, admitted the turn signal was activated for a "brief moment."
- Fuller stopped Shipp for speeding (and perceived failure to signal); contact led to a DWI arrest.
- Shipp pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain but appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress, arguing the stop lacked reasonable suspicion and urging broader protection under the Texas Constitution.
- The trial court made factual findings crediting Fuller; the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fuller had reasonable suspicion to stop for speeding | Fuller’s visual estimate was too conclusory; radar not locked so no specific facts to justify stop | Fuller observed speeding, radar briefly flashed 66, and he estimated 57–60 mph based on training | Court: Officer’s training, visual estimate, and brief radar reading provided specific articulable facts; stop was justified |
| Whether officer must use radar or know exact speed to justify stop | Shipp: Officer's estimate insufficient; Ford requires more specific facts | State: No statutory or constitutional requirement to use radar or know exact speed; experience-based estimates may suffice | Court: Use of radar not mandatory; experience-based speed estimates can supply reasonable suspicion |
| Whether failure-to-signal provided independent basis for stop | Shipp: Video shows signal came on briefly; insufficient to support stop for failing to signal | State: Officer reasonably perceived improper signaling before review | Court: Court avoided ruling on this because speeding alone justified the stop |
| Whether Texas Constitution provides greater protection than Fourth Amendment and whether claim preserved | Shipp: Texas Constitution affords broader protection here | State: Argument not preserved; trial court not given that specific argument | Court: Claim not preserved for appeal; and even on merits Texas law generally construes Article I §9 like the Fourth Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (reasonable-suspicion standard for investigative stops)
- Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (articulable facts and mixed question of law and fact review)
- Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (officer testimony that is conclusory may be insufficient to support stop)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (traffic violations observed provide legal basis for stops)
- Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (officer need not know exact speed; radar not mandatory)
- Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (abuse-of-discretion standard for suppression rulings)
- Hankston v. State, 517 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (Article I §9 of the Texas Constitution generally interpreted like the Fourth Amendment)