Justin Renel Joseph v. the Metropolitan Museum of Art, City of New York
684 F. App'x 16
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Pro se plaintiff Justin Renel Joseph sued the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met) and the City of New York under Title II and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the First Amendment, alleging that the Met’s display of paintings depicting Jesus as white was discriminatory.
- Joseph claimed the City was implicated because it provided funding to the Met.
- The district court dismissed Joseph’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); this appeal followed.
- Joseph conceded he was allowed access to the Met; his complaint targeted the content of exhibits rather than denial of entry or different treatment.
- He sought relief under disparate-impact and disparate-treatment theories, and alternatively argued the City’s funding made the displays government speech.
- The district court denied leave to amend; the Second Circuit reviewed the 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title II liability for discriminatory display | Joseph argued the Met’s exhibit content (portrayals of Jesus as white) amounted to discrimination actionable under Title II | Met argued Title II protects equal access/use of public accommodations, not particular exhibit content; Joseph was not denied access or treated differently | Dismissed — Title II requires denial of equal access or different treatment; Joseph conceded access and alleged only offensive content |
| Title II disparate-impact theory | Joseph sought to proceed on disparate-impact theory | Defendants argued Title II claims require denial/different treatment; disparate-impact not pleaded as causing denial of access | Dismissed — complaint failed to allege physical denial or differential treatment required by Title II |
| Title VI disparate-impact/declaratory relief | Joseph argued Title VI disparate-impact and declaratory relief were available | Defendants relied on Supreme Court precedent holding Title VI reaches only intentional discrimination | Dismissed — Title VI private suits require intentional discrimination (Sandoval precedent) |
| Government-speech via city funding | Joseph argued City funding made Met displays government speech causing Titles II/VI violations | Defendants noted claim is derivative of the dismissed discrimination claims and fails if underlying claims fail | Dismissed — derivative claim fails because underlying discrimination claims were not plausibly alleged |
| Leave to amend | Joseph argued the court should allow amendment (he is pro se) | Defendants argued amendment would be futile | Denied — amendment would be futile; complaint and briefs gave no indication a plausible claim could be stated |
Key Cases Cited
- Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumed truth when assessing plausibility)
- Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (Title II’s purpose to eliminate discriminatory denials of access to public accommodations)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (discussion of Title VI’s scope and reliance on Sandoval)
- Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (private plaintiffs may not enforce disparate-impact regulations under Title VI; Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination)
- Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (pro se complaints should be given leave to amend when complaint gives any indication a valid claim might be stated)
- Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (amendment may be denied as futile)