Justin Reed v. Norfolk Southern Railway Compa
740 F.3d 420
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Justin Reed, a Norfolk Southern trackman, suffered abdominal pain at work, later acknowledged the injury might be work-related, and was fired for inconsistent statements and violating a company reporting rule.
- Reed, represented by his union, pursued mandatory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) before Public Law Board 6394 claiming his termination violated the collective bargaining agreement; the Board ordered reinstatement without back pay.
- While arbitration was pending, Reed sued Norfolk Southern under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), alleging retaliatory discharge for reporting a work-related injury.
- Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment in the FRSA action, arguing FRSA’s election-of-remedies clause (49 U.S.C. § 20109(f)) bars pursuing both an RLA grievance/arbitration and an FRSA claim for the same conduct.
- The district court denied summary judgment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that § 20109(f) bars seeking protection under overlapping substantive legal protections, but not pursuing arbitration under an RLA-mandated forum that vindicates contractual rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FRSA § 20109(f) bars both arbitration under the RLA and an FRSA lawsuit for the same alleged retaliatory act | Reed: Arbitration was mandatory and he sought contractual relief, so § 20109(f) does not bar his FRSA claim | NSR: The RLA is a “provision of law”; by pursuing arbitration Reed elected that remedy and cannot also seek FRSA relief | Held: § 20109(f) prohibits seeking protection under two substantive legal provisions, but RLA arbitration vindicates contractual rights, not protection "under" the RLA; Reed may proceed with FRSA claim |
| Whether the RLA counts as a "provision of law" under § 20109(f) | Reed: Collective bargaining agreement/arbitration is private contract remedy, not a statutory protection under FRSA's phrasing | NSR: Dispatchers supports treating the RLA as a provision of law for this purpose | Held: Even if RLA is a federal statute, it does not provide substantive protection like FRSA; the clause targets other laws that grant substantive antiretaliation/whistleblower protections |
| Proper scope of "seek protection under" in § 20109(f) | Reed: Seeking arbitration vindicates contractual rights, not seeking protection under a statute | NSR: Bringing a RLA-mandated grievance is effectively seeking relief under that law | Held: "Seek protection under" means invoking substantive protections of a law; bringing a contractual grievance does not qualify |
| Interaction with § 20109(h) saving clause (2007) | Reed: § 20109(h) preserves remedies under collective bargaining agreements, supporting permissibility of both remedies | NSR: Election rule does not diminish rights because employees can pick one remedy | Held: § 20109(h) supports reading § 20109(f) narrowly to avoid diminishing collective-bargaining remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320 (RLA’s compulsory arbitration stems from statute, not contract)
- Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117 (treats RLA as "law" for interpreting other statutes in that context)
- Terminal R.R. Ass’n v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (RLA provides procedures for resolving bargaining disputes, not substantive workplace protections)
- Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (describing RLA’s role in labor dispute resolution)
- Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (same: RLA’s limited remedial scope)
- Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (arbitration vindicates contractual rights under a collective bargaining agreement)
- Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 697 F.2d 771 (regulation of an activity by statute does not mean private disputes arise "under" that statute)
- Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654 (discussing RLA arbitration procedures)
- Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (distinguishing causes of action that confer substantive rights from statutes that provide procedural remedies)