Justin Lee Lunceford v. Commonwealth of Virginia
1234151
| Va. Ct. App. | Oct 25, 2016Background
- Justin Lunceford and Brandi Jankosky had a long-term relationship, shared a son, and frequently argued during custody exchanges; she was financially dependent on him.
- On March 15, 2014, after placing their son in Jankosky’s car in a Wal-Mart parking lot, Lunceford got into the front passenger seat and argued with her for over an hour, pressuring her for future sex.
- Jankosky repeatedly asked him to leave; she at one point tried to exit but was told by Lunceford “not to make a scene.” He grabbed her arm once; she said she believed he was only trying to get her attention.
- Their son cried during the argument; Lunceford threatened to spank him. Jankosky said she stayed in the car to avoid escalating into a public fight and to keep their son out of the middle, and testified she was “not scared of him.”
- At the end of the encounter, Lunceford took Jankosky’s phone; she retrieved it, hit him, and both left separately. She reported the incident three months later; Lunceford was convicted of abduction under Va. Code § 18.2-47(A).
- At trial, the judge denied motions to strike, reasoning Jankosky was effectively detained in her own vehicle with the child present; the court convicted Lunceford, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Lunceford's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether detention occurred by intimidation under Va. Code § 18.2-47(A) | Jankosky’s remaining in the car to avoid a public escalation amounted to intimidation detaining her; factfinder could infer fear from prior domestic incidents | Jankosky stayed for non-intimidation reasons (to avoid a scene, economic dependence); she testified she wasn’t scared and could have left | Reversed — evidence insufficient to show intimidation overbore her will |
| Whether prior domestic violence supported inferring fear despite victim’s denial | Prior domestic violence permits the factfinder to discredit victim’s claim of not being afraid | Prior incidents are ambiguous and not shown to be one-sided; speculation cannot substitute for evidence | Court held past references didn’t support a reasonable inference of fear here |
| Whether fear for the child justified finding intimidation | Commonwealth suggested she may have remained fearing harm to the son | Defense noted no testimony that she feared for the child; she said she stayed to avoid a scene | Court found no testimony supporting fear for the child; argument raised too late and unsupported |
| Whether appellate standard requires affirming bench verdict | Commonwealth argued credibility/inferences favor affirmance | Defense argued evidence legally insufficient as a matter of law | Court applied Jackson standard and reversed — no reasonable inference of intimidation |
Key Cases Cited
- Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654 (defining "intimidation" as inducing fear of bodily harm that overbears the will)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
- Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190 (appellate review standard for bench trials)
- Powell v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 20 (view evidence in light most favorable to prevailing party)
- Breeden v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 169 (factfinder may discredit victim’s testimony where contradicted)
- Cairns v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 271 (prior violence can inform victim’s fear of bodily harm)
