Justin Fairfax v. CBS Corporation, 2 F.4th 286

April 1–2, 2019 CBS This Morning aired separate interviews of Vanessa Tyson and Meredith Watson accusing Virginia Lt. Gov. Justin Fairfax of sexual assault; Fairfax denied both allegations as consensual.
CBS questioned the women on air, read and linked Fairfax’s written denial, and reported ancillary facts (e.g., Duke’s statement, a reported polygraph) during the broadcasts.
Fairfax later (July 2019) disclosed, for the first time, an alleged eyewitness he claimed would contradict Watson; he then demanded a CBS retraction, which CBS refused.
Fairfax sued CBS for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the district court granted CBS’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to plead actual malice and denied CBS’s request for attorney’s fees under Va. Code § 8.01‑223.2(B).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed: (1) Fairfax failed to plausibly plead actual malice required for a public‑official defamation claim, and (2) Virginia’s anti‑SLAPP fee provision is discretionary ("may"), not mandatory or presumptive.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fairfax plausibly pleaded "actual malice" for defamation/IIED as a public official	CBS had obvious reasons to doubt the women (prior reticence, political motive, lack of corroboration) and failed to investigate, and CBS ignored a list of potential witnesses including an alleged eyewitness	CBS probed the women on air, published Fairfax’s denial, attempted to contact suggested witnesses, had no knowledge of the eyewitness before July, and did not purposefully avoid the truth	Dismissal affirmed: allegations do not plausibly show knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard; post‑publication facts do not prove state of mind at publication; IIED fails for same reason
Whether Va. Code § 8.01‑223.2(B) requires or presumptively awards attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant	Fairfax (respondent) defended the district court’s discretionary reading of the statute	CBS argued the statute should create a presumption (or be treated as mandatory) in favor of awarding fees to prevailing defendants	Affirmed: the plain word "may" is permissive and discretionary; no presumption or mandatory fee award under Virginia law

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (establishes actual‑malice standard for public‑official defamation)
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (U.S. 1968) (recklessness requires a defendant to have entertained serious doubts about truth)
Harte‑Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (U.S. 1989) (purposeful avoidance of the truth can support actual malice)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (distinguishes public vs. private plaintiffs and explains limits on defamation liability)
Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1991) (actual malice is subjective; mere failure to investigate is insufficient)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard: complaint must state a plausible claim)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (establishes the plausibility pleading standard)