Justin Evans v. John Kuplinski, 713 F. App'x 167

Justin Evans, a pretrial detainee with longstanding severe mental illness (bipolar disorder, history of self-harm and psychiatric commitments), sued seven Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail (VPRJ) officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged assaults, poor conditions, and denial of access to courts.
Evans filed pro se while committed to Central State Hospital (a psychiatric facility) and remained there throughout the district-court litigation; the facility provided only very limited access to writing implements and no law library.
Defendants moved for summary judgment and to dismiss; the district court found most claims time-barred under Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations and granted judgment, without addressing tolling arguments Evans mentioned.
Evans repeatedly requested appointed counsel; the district court denied all requests, finding no exceptional circumstances to warrant appointment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
On appeal Evans argued the denial of counsel was an abuse of discretion because (a) his claims involved complex tolling issues and (b) his severe mental illness plus lack of access to research at the psychiatric hospital prevented effective litigation.
The Fourth Circuit concluded the record showed exceptional circumstances, vacated the dismissal, and remanded with instructions to request appointment of counsel for Evans.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court abused discretion by denying appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)	Evans: his severe mental illness and lack of access to legal research created exceptional circumstances requiring appointed counsel	Defs: no exceptional circumstances; Evans could litigate pro se	Court: Abuse of discretion — exceptional circumstances existed; remand to request counsel
Whether tolling (incapacity or obstruction) could render time-barred § 1983 claims timely	Evans: statute of limitations may be tolled due to incapacitation and defendants’ interference with access to courts; he could not research specifics while committed	Defs: argued claims were time-barred (did not meaningfully address tolling below)	Court: Tolling issue was legally complex and colorable; failure to develop it below due in part to lack of counsel warranted appointment

Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984) (standard for appointing counsel for indigent pro se litigant; exceptional circumstances required)
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (declining to read a right to appointed counsel into in forma pauperis statute)
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (§ 1983 claims borrow state personal-injury statute of limitations)
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (uniform rule that federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for § 1983)
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (federal courts borrow state tolling rules for § 1983 claims)
Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1982) (type and complexity of case inform exceptional-circumstances analysis)