Justice, S., Aplt. v. Trooper Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057

Background

On Nov. 27, 2013 Trooper Joseph Lombardo, on duty and in uniform, stopped Shiretta Justice for vehicle violations; her car was towed because she and her passenger lacked valid licenses.
After the tow arrived, Justice and her stepson moved behind a 3.5-foot Jersey barrier off the roadway; Justice refused Lombardo's offers to ride in his patrol car because she expected private transportation.
Lombardo jumped the barrier, wrestled Justice, handcuffed her, then released her when her ride arrived; Justice was not arrested or charged.
At trial the jury awarded Justice $160,000, finding Lombardo acted outside the scope of employment; the trial court denied Lombardo's JNOV/new-trial motion.
The Commonwealth Court reversed and ordered JNOV for Lombardo, holding his use of force was incidental to his highway-enforcement duties and therefore within the scope of employment.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, holding the scope-of-employment question was fact-intensive and properly for the jury; it remanded to consider Lombardo's new-trial claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Justice)	Defendant's Argument (Lombardo)	Held
Whether Lombardo's wrestling and handcuffing were within the scope of employment (sovereign immunity bars suit if yes)	Force was not related to an arrest or safety need, appeared personally motivated, and thus was outside scope	Trooper was performing highway-safety duties, authorized to use force and transport motorists; handcuffing was incidental and therefore within scope	The question is fact‑intensive; jury reasonably found conduct outside scope. Commonwealth Court erred in ordering JNOV; case remanded to evaluate new‑trial issues
Whether the employer (PSP) would have expected the use of force under circumstances (Restatement §228(d))	PSP would not expect force against a motorist removed behind a barrier, not under arrest	Given policing duties, force by troopers is generally expected when enforcing laws or ensuring safety	Jury could reasonably find the force was unexpected by the PSP under these facts; not resolvable as a matter of law
Whether PSP policies authorized handcuffing of a non‑prisoner motorist after impoundment	FRM section cited applies to "prisoners" and does not explicitly authorize handcuffing non‑prisoner motorists; testimony was ambiguous	PSP training and FRM guidance (as interpreted by defense witness) require searching and handcuffing persons transported in PSP vehicles for safety	The jury could discredit the PSP‑policy justification; policy did not compel a legal conclusion that handcuffing was authorized
Appropriateness of JNOV/new trial standard (procedural)	Verdict should stand because evidence permitted inference of personal animus and lack of authorization	JNOV appropriate because all evidence viewed favorably to plaintiff nonetheless compels judgment for defendant as matter of law	JNOV was improper; issue belonged to jury because reasonable minds could differ; remand to Commonwealth Court to consider new‑trial grounds

Key Cases Cited

Orr v. William J. Burns Intern. Detective Agency, 12 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1940) (scope-of-employment ordinarily a question for the jury)
Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) (standards for JNOV review; view evidence in light most favorable to verdict winner)
Lunn v. Boyd, 169 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1961) (distinguishing scope-of-employment for vicarious liability)
Howard v. Zaney Bar, 85 A.2d 401 (Pa. 1952) (excessive or outrageous force may be outside scope of employment)
Brennan v. Merchant & Co., Inc., 54 A. 891 (Pa. 1903) (employer not vicariously liable where employee acted to gratify personal ill will)
Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Knox, 113 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1955) (outwardly outrageous acts indicate lack of intent to serve employer)
Iandiorio v. Kriss & Senko Enterprises, Inc., 517 A.2d 530 (Pa. 1986) (if multiple inferences possible, scope-of-employment is for the jury)
Pilipovich v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 172 A. 136 (Pa. 1934) (contrast examples where jury may find unauthorized conduct within scope)