Just Puppies, Inc. v. Anthony Brown, 123 F.4th 652

Maryland enacted the 2021 Pet Store Statute, prohibiting retail pet stores from selling or transferring cats and dogs, aiming to combat sales from “puppy mills.”
The statute allows breeders to sell directly to the public (including online) but prohibits brokers and retail stores from dog sales.
Plaintiffs include Maryland pet stores, an out-of-state USDA-licensed broker, and a Missouri dog breeder, all of whom were economically impacted by the ban.
Plaintiffs sued, alleging preemption by the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The district court dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim; plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, upholding the statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Federal Preemption (AWA)	The AWA preempts Maryland's statute via field and obstacle preemption, intending a uniform standard that precludes state bans.	The AWA expressly contemplates concurrent state regulation and does not fully occupy the field or preclude state bans.	No preemption; statute valid under AWA.
Dormant Commerce Clause – Discrimination	The statute intentionally and effectively discriminates against out-of-state breeders/brokers by favoring in-state breeders.	The law is facially neutral, banning all retail/broker dog sales regardless of origin; out-of-state and in-state breeders can still sell directly.	No discrimination; statute valid.
Dormant Commerce Clause – Pike Balancing	Even if not discriminatory, the statute’s burden on interstate commerce outweighs any local benefit.	The statute serves legitimate local interests (animal welfare, consumer protection); burdens are incidental and do not outweigh benefits.	Statute survives Pike balancing; no violation.
Legislative Purpose	Legislative history reveals discriminatory intent to aid Maryland businesses and hurt out-of-state breeders.	The legislative record shows concern with “puppy mills” and animal welfare, not protectionism.	No plausible claim of discriminatory purpose found.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (Commerce Clause does not protect a preferred business structure or method)
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (Commerce Clause prohibits discriminatory treatment between in-state and out-of-state economic interests)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (standards for plausibility in pleading)
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (express and implied preemption framework)
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (discriminatory state laws under Commerce Clause only valid with no less discriminatory alternative)
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (dormant Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism)
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (Commerce Clause analysis focuses on effects, not motives)
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (balancing test for nondiscriminatory state statutes affecting interstate commerce)
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (Commerce Clause focuses on marketwide effects, not specific firms)