Junfei Ge v. United States Citizenship and, 20f4th147

Junfei Ge, a Chinese national who enlisted through the MAVNI program, filed for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) on May 25, 2016; USCIS scheduled then canceled his July 2017 oath after DoD-ordered enhanced background checks.
After about three years without a final agency decision, Ge filed suit under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) on December 27, 2018, asking the district court to grant naturalization or remand with instructions to adjudicate and hold an oath ceremony by a date certain.
USCIS moved to remand; the district court remanded and ordered USCIS to adjudicate Ge’s application within 45 days, retained jurisdiction to decide the matter if USCIS failed to comply, and stayed the case for 60 days.
Ge was sworn in on July 17, 2019; the district court dismissed the case with prejudice after the oath ceremony.
Ge filed for attorney’s fees under the EAJA (28 U.S.C. § 2412), claiming he was the prevailing party because the remand order materially altered the parties’ legal relationship; the district court denied fees, concluding Ge was not a prevailing party.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the remand order was interlocutory/procedural, not a merits judgment or consent decree, and did not materially alter the legal relationship required for prevailing-party status under the EAJA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ge was a "prevailing party" under the EAJA	The district court’s remand with a 45‑day deadline materially altered the legal relationship and was judicially enforceable, so Ge prevailed.	The remand was an interlocutory/procedural order, not a merits judgment or consent decree, so it did not make Ge a prevailing party.	Not prevailing: remand was procedural/interlocutory and not the kind of judicially sanctioned final relief that confers prevailing‑party status.
Whether the remand order was a judgment on the merits or equivalent to a consent decree / materially altered legal relationship	The remand effectuated § 1447(b) relief and imposed an enforceable deadline, functionally equivalent to merits relief or a consent decree.	The order was not final or a court‑approved settlement; it left merits decision to USCIS and did not change the substantive applicant–agency relationship.	Order was neither a merits judgment nor a consent decree and did not materially change the legal relationship; mere procedural relief is insufficient.

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (fee awards require a judicially sanctioned material alteration—typically a judgment or court‑ordered consent decree)
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987) (plaintiff must receive some merits relief to prevail)
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (interlocutory rulings do not confer prevailing‑party status)
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) ("material alteration" requires resolution changing legal relationship)
Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (preliminary injunction is not an enforceable merits judgment for fee purposes)
Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747 (4th Cir. 2006) (Buckhannon interpreted narrowly by Fourth Circuit)
J.D. ex rel. Davis v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 571 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2009) (prevailing‑party relief must be judicially sanctioned and enforceable final relief)
Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2007) (proper § 1447(b) petition vests federal court jurisdiction over naturalization application)
Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (preliminary injunctive relief does not guarantee fee entitlement if merits are decided against plaintiff)