Juliette Karger v. Commissioner of Social Security
414 F. App'x 739
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Karger, born 1982, alleged disability onset in 1998 and testified in 2006; has GED and no past relevant work.
- Hospitalized for psychiatric emergency in 1998 with bipolar disorder, possible ADHD, and OCD; GAF 10 at that time.
- Treating psychologist Dana Watts, Ph.D., diagnosed bipolar disorder, OCD, and ADHD in 2002–2003 with substantial functional limitations; opined poor to no ability in work-related areas.
- Treating physician Dr. Thomas Thysseril, M.D., evaluated Karger in 2005–2006; documented bipolar I, OCD, cannabis use, personality features; GAF around 50–70; generally moderate symptoms over multiple visits.
- ALJ in 2006 found five severe impairments but RFC limiting to simple, low-stress work with limited social contact; did not adequately discuss Watts or Thysseril or reconcile conflicting opinions.
- District court and Magistrate recommended remand for comprehensive evaluation of medical opinions and a new RFC; Sixth Circuit reversed district court and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ properly weighed treating-source opinions | Karger argues Watts’s treating opinions were not given proper weight or explained. | The ALJ relied on other substantial evidence and did not err in weighting opinions. | Remand required; ALJ failed to provide good reasons for discounting Watts and to reconcile treating and non-treating opinions. |
| Whether the ALJ properly considered all medical source opinions | ALJ failed to discuss Bartle, Menken, and Thysseril sufficiently. | Not all opinions must be discussed to satisfy substantial evidence. | Remand to address all medical opinions and their impact on RFC. |
| Whether the RFC is supported by substantial evidence given conflicting medical opinions | RFC should reflect treating sources' limitations if supported by record. | RFC is supported by non-treating sources and overall evidence. | Remand to recalculate RFC after proper weighing of all medical evidence. |
| Whether harmless-error doctrine applies to treating-source regulation failure | ALJ’s failure to discuss Watts/Menken cannot be harmless given potential disability findings. | If evidence supports the outcome, error could be harmless. | Not harmless here; procedural error requires remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 148 F. App’x 456 (6th Cir. 2005) (ALJ must adequately explain treating-source discounting for proper review)
- Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2004) (harmless error analysis for treating-source requirement)
- Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543 (6th Cir. 2010) (factors for weighing treating sources; need for sufficiently specific reasons)
- Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009) (ALJ must explain weighing of treating opinions and cannot rely on post hoc rationalizations)
- Faucher v. HHS, 17 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1994) (tenets of substantial evidence review and weight of medical opinions)
- Siterlet v. HHS, 823 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1987) (minimally probative nature of certain treating opinions when outside insured status)