Juliette Grimmett v. Nancy Freeman, 59 F.4th 689

North Carolina statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-274(a)(9)) makes it a misdemeanor to publish “derogatory reports” about any candidate in an election if the speaker knows the report is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
In 2020, an ad produced for Josh Stein’s campaign stated Jim O’Neill left 1,500 rape kits untested; an opposing committee complained to the State Board of Elections.
The Board investigated, recommended no charges, and expressed constitutional concerns; a local district attorney subsequently continued the investigation through the SBI and later indicated an intent to present charges to a grand jury.
Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment and an injunction, obtained a temporary restraining order, but the district court later vacated the TRO and denied a preliminary injunction solely on the ground plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo the statutory interpretation and First Amendment issues and concluded plaintiffs were likely to succeed, vacating the district court’s order and remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiffs' Argument	Freeman's Argument	Held
Whether the statute criminalizes truthful statements	The statute’s "reckless disregard" disjunctive language reaches true statements made recklessly and thus punishes truthful speech.	"Derogatory" implies falsehood; statute should be read to target only false reports.	Court: Likely reaches truthful speech; that is unconstitutional under Garrison.
Whether the statute is an impermissible content-based restriction	The law singles out speech about candidates intended to affect elections, a subject-based distinction that targets political speech.	Analogized to permissible libel or narrowly tailored categories (e.g., threats); asserts interest in protecting elections.	Court: Content-based and under R.A.V. facially invalid; limitation to candidate-targeted speech is not justified.
Whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits for preliminary injunction	Plaintiffs: statute likely unconstitutional for the above reasons, so likelihood of success is high.	Freeman: Garrison permits criminal libel laws that target false statements made with actual malice; statute is constitutional.	Court: Plaintiffs likely to succeed; district court abused discretion in denying preliminary relief on merits ground alone and remanded for remaining factors.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (truthful statements about public affairs cannot be criminally punished)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (government may not selectively prohibit otherwise permitted speech based on subject/content)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (actual malice standard for defamation of public officials)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinction between public figures and private individuals in libel law)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (contextual reasons may justify content-specific regulation of particular historically virulent conduct)
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standards for issuing a preliminary injunction)
Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (comment on the strength of a movant’s likelihood of success)