Julie Conrad v. Council of Senior Citizens of Gilmer County
14-1262
| W. Va. | Nov 16, 2016Background
- Julie Conrad was an at-will homemaker employed by The Council of Senior Citizens of Gilmer County from 2002 until she resigned in January 2013, alleging threats and vandalism by a client’s family member tied to an assigned placement.
- Conrad told her supervisor repeatedly she felt unsafe and could no longer work at that placement; she alleges the supervisor told her to “stick it out.”
- Conrad resigned, then sued alleging constructive retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy (invoking W. Va. Code § 21-3-1) and the tort of outrage; the tort claim was not pursued on appeal.
- The circuit court granted defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, finding Conrad’s complaint too factually sparse and that § 21-3-1 did not impose a duty to protect employees from third-party acts beyond the employer’s control.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the complaint failed to allege facts showing the employer violated § 21-3-1 with respect to workplace conditions under the employer’s control or that such violation led to a discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Conrad pled a Harless-based retaliatory discharge grounded in W. Va. Code § 21-3-1 | Conrad: employer sent her into a known, unsafe placement and required her to continue working, contravening public policy | Respondent: complaint lacks facts showing a statutory duty breach or that the employer controlled the unsafe conditions | Court: Dismissed — complaint failed to plead facts showing workplace was unsafe or employer-controlled conditions leading to discharge |
| Whether § 21-3-1 constitutes a sufficiently specific “substantial public policy” to support Harless claim | Conrad: § 21-3-1 establishes public policy requiring reasonably safe employment | Respondent: statute is too general or inapplicable to third-party, off-premises acts | Court: Did not decide generally but found under these facts § 21-3-1 not shown to apply; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether employer can be liable for third-party acts outside employer control under § 21-3-1 | Conrad: employer failed to remedy known threats; could have reassigned her | Respondent: employer has no duty to protect from third-party acts outside workplace control | Court: Held employer not shown to have control; third-party off-premises acts not within § 21-3-1 responsibility as pled |
| Sufficiency of pleading for constructive (forced) discharge | Conrad: alleged working conditions so intolerable she was forced to quit | Respondent: allegations are conclusory and sparse | Court: Complaint too conclusory to permit inference of constructive retaliatory discharge; dismissal proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Harless v. First Nat’l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (establishes public-policy exception to at-will employment for retaliatory discharge)
- Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 188 W.Va. 371, 424 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1992) (requires substantial public policy source to provide specific guidance)
- Pack v. Van Meter, 177 W.Va. 485, 354 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1986) (distinguishes employer vs. owner duties under workplace safety statutes)
- Henderson v. Meredith Lumber Co., 190 W.Va. 292, 438 S.E.2d 324 (W. Va. 1993) (explains employer duty relates to employment activity controlled by employer)
- Slack v. Kanawha Cty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 423 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1992) (defines constructive discharge standard)
- Frohnapfel v. ArcelorMittal USA LLC, 235 W.Va. 165, 772 S.E.2d 350 (W. Va. 2015) (example of actionable discharge tied to clear statutory policy)