Julian Robert Marfil v. State
366 P.3d 969
Wyo.2016Background
- Defendant Julian Marfil, then ~45, was found in a hotel room with B.L., who was 14–15 during the period charged; B.L. testified they had a sexual relationship that began when she was 14 and that she became pregnant.
- State charged Marfil with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-315(a)(i) (actor 17+ inflicts sexual intrusion on victim 13–15 who is ≥4 years younger).
- At trial Marfil conceded intercourse but argued as his defense that he did not "inflict" sexual intrusion because the acts were consensual; the court gave a theory-of-defense instruction but refused Marfil’s proffered definition of "inflict" ("to impose as something that must be borne or suffered; or to impose anything unwelcome").
- During deliberations the jury asked for a dictionary and a copy of the statute; the court denied the dictionary and directed jurors to the instructions. Both sides had agreed to that response at trial.
- Jury convicted on both counts; Marfil appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by refusing (1) his proffered definition of "inflict," and (2) to give that definition after the jury requested a dictionary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Marfil) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "inflicts" in § 6-2-315(a)(i) requires nonconsensual or unwelcome conduct | "Inflicts" need not be defined as additional element; statute and precedent treat it like ordinary statutory language | "Inflicts" means to impose something unwelcome or to be borne, so consensual activity cannot be "inflicted" | Court held no special meaning; "inflicts" and "engages in" are equivalent for § 6-2-315 and do not require unwelcome or nonconsensual conduct |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by refusing Marfil’s proffered jury instruction defining "inflicts" | Refusal proper because instruction would misstate law and inject a de facto consent defense barred by Wyoming law | Needed that definition to present his theory that intercourse was consensual and thus not "inflicted" | Refusal affirmed: instruction would have misstated law and was unnecessary because term required no technical definition |
| Whether the court erred by denying jury’s request for a dictionary during deliberations | Denial proper; direct jurors to the instructions and statute they were given | When jury sought a dictionary it showed confusion about "inflicts" and court should have supplied Marfil’s definition | No error: jury didn’t specify which word, "inflicts" does not require definition, and giving Marfil’s definition would have misstated law |
| Whether error was invited or waived by defense counsel agreeing to deny dictionary | State: defense counsel joined in denying dictionary, so claim invited/waived | Marfil: he challenges denial of his proffered definition, not the dictionary per se | Court declined to treat it as invited error and reviewed the merits; nonetheless affirmed on substantive grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1998) (discusses consent/incapacity and distinctions among sexual-offense statutes)
- Crain v. State, 218 P.3d 934 (Wyo. 2009) (upheld conviction under same § 6-2-315(a)(i) even where intercourse was consensual)
- Phillips v. State, 151 P.3d 1131 (Wyo. 2007) (consent of victim under 16 is not a defense)
- Ross v. State, 93 P. 299 (Wyo. 1908) (early statement that a minor is regarded as resisting regardless of actual state of mind)
- Brown v. State, 340 P.3d 1020 (Wyo. 2015) (standards for jury-instruction review and duty to clarify instructions when jury confused)
- Robert L. Kroenlein Trust ex rel. Alden v. Kirchhefer, 357 P.3d 1118 (Wyo. 2015) (statutory interpretation principles; construing statutes in pari materia)