Julia Snell v. Thomas Davis, 1385201

Background

Julia Shell and Thomas Davis divorced in 2012; their written separation agreement (incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree) required husband to pay spousal support.
Husband petitioned the J&DR court to modify support; the court found a material change and reduced support retroactive to April 1, 2018, with a July 2019 order that acknowledged no arrearages but did not set repayment for resulting overpayments.
Because the reduction was retroactive, husband had overpaid from April 2018 through July 2019; husband later filed (Nov. 4, 2019) a motion asking the court to set a repayment schedule for overages.
The J&DR court (Feb. 21, 2020) found husband had overpaid ~$28,000 and ordered wife to repay $500/month; wife appealed to the circuit court.
The circuit court affirmed, recalculated the overage as $15,250 (as of Nov. 9, 2020) and allowed husband to deduct $500/month from his spousal support obligation until repaid. Wife appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.
On appeal, wife argued the overage-repayment motion was barred by Rule 1:1, res judicata, and Code § 20-107.1; the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court on all issues and denied both parties’ requests for appellate attorney’s fees.

Issues

Issue	Wife's Argument	Husband's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 1:1 barred husband’s Nov. 4, 2019 motion for repayment of overpayments	Rule 1:1’s 21-day limit for modifying final orders precluded the late motion	The July 2019 support order did not dispose of the overage issue; court retained jurisdiction to resolve repayment	Not barred: the support order did not resolve overages and left a matter pending, so Rule 1:1 did not preclude the motion
Whether res judicata/claim preclusion barred the overage-repayment claim	Husband’s repayment claim arises from same transaction as his modification petition and thus is precluded	The repayment claim arose only after the court’s retroactive reduction created overpayments; it is a new claim	Not barred: claim preclusion inapplicable because the overage claim arose from the support order itself and did not exist before it
Whether Code § 20‑107.1 required the support order to address overages (i.e., interpret “arrearages” to include overages)	The statute’s requirement to state arrearages implies overages must also be identified and addressed in the order	The statute on its face mandates addressing arrearages only; it does not require addressing overpayments—retroactive adjustments are permitted by other statutes	Not barred: the statute’s plain language covers arrearages only; court will not read “overages” into the statute and retroactive modification was authorized elsewhere
Award of appellate attorney’s fees	Wife sought fees; husband also sought fees	Each party sought costs on appeal	Denied: appellate court exercised discretion and denied both requests

Key Cases Cited

Rubino v. Rubino, 64 Va. App. 256 (2015) (orders presumed to reflect court’s actions; court "speaks through its orders")
Super Fresh Food Markets of Virginia, Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555 (2002) (definition of a final judgment that disposes of the entire action)
Levy v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 68 Va. App. 575 (2018) (standard for reviewing res judicata questions)
CDM Enterprises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 702 (2000) (explains res judicata and its preclusion categories)
Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409 (1993) (court cannot order restitution where support order was erroneous and reversed; contrasts restitution vs. valid retroactive modification)
Bailey v. Spangler, 289 Va. 353 (2015) (statutory interpretation: courts must follow plain language of legislature)
O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690 (1996) (appellate court’s authority and discretion to award attorney’s fees on appeal)