Julia Pylant v. Southern Methodist University, 814 F.3d 701

Background

Donald Cuba was accused of sexual assault by Julia Pylant; SMU initially found him responsible, later dismissed charges for procedural defects, then reinstated after a letter from Julia’s parents; a grand jury later indicted Cuba and he was acquitted at trial.
Cuba sued Julia and her parents (the Pylants) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference; Julia sued Cuba for assault/battery and IIED and Cuba counterclaimed.
The Pylants filed motions to dismiss under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (TCPA), triggering the statute’s accelerated hearing/ruling timetable and discovery stay.
The district court failed to schedule the statutorily-required hearing and later ruled that, because it missed the TCPA deadlines, the motions had been denied by operation of law and therefore its later rulings were moot; the Pylants appealed interlocutorily.
The Fifth Circuit held the appeals timely because (1) a TCPA deemed-denial is triggered from the date of the required hearing, and (2) no hearing was ever held here, so the motions were not deemed denied until the district court’s actual March 6, 2015 order; the court reached the merits of the TCPA motions on appeal.
On the merits the court concluded the TCPA applied (Pylants’ communications were petitioning activity) and: malicious-prosecution claims survive at this stage; defamation claims survive in part (limitations bars and absolute-privilege defenses apply to some statements but not others); tortious-interference claim fails for lack of clear, specific showing of contract breach/terms.

Issues

Issue	Cuba's Argument	Pylants' Argument	Held
Whether the TCPA timing/deemed-denial rules barred the Pylants’ interlocutory appeals	Deemed denials occurred by operation of Texas law 120 days after filing, so the 30-day appellate clock ran then, making appeals untimely	TCPA deadlines don’t start where no hearing was set; appeals timely because no hearing occurred and Rule 4 clock ran from district court’s March 6 order	Appeal timely: deemed-denial clock runs from date of statutorily required hearing; because no hearing occurred, motion was not deemed denied and appeal was timely
Whether the TCPA applies in federal diversity cases (assumed but not decided)	Cuba did not contest application here (court assumed TCPA governs as state substantive law)	Pylants relied on TCPA to dismiss	Court assumed (without deciding) TCPA applies and proceeded on that basis
Whether the Pylants’ communications are protected petitioning activity under TCPA	N/A (Cuba conceded most communications were to SMU/police)	Communications to SMU and prosecutorial authorities are exercises of right to petition	Held: communications (including parents’ letter to SMU president) fall within TCPA’s petitioning definition
Whether Cuba met the TCPA’s burden to present clear and specific evidence to avoid dismissal of each claim	Malicious prosecution, defamation, and interference are pleaded with sufficient specific facts to survive; damages, malice, lack of probable cause alleged	Pylants argued lack of evidence on probable cause, malice, damages; asserted limitations and absolute-privilege defenses; argued tortious-interference lacked contract specificity	Malicious-prosecution: survives (pleadings suffice on lack of probable cause, malice, damages). Defamation: survives in part — March 2012 SMU statements time-barred; statements to prosecutors/police during investigation are absolutely privileged (later statements), but initial police report and SMU statements are not absolutely privileged. Tortious interference: dismissed for failure to provide clear, specific allegations identifying contract terms, breach, and causation.

Key Cases Cited

NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing TCPA purpose and interlocutory review under federal law)
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (federal application of state anti‑SLAPP statute assumed for Erie analysis)
Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2013) (holding an out‑of‑time order after a deemed denial is a legal nullity)
Kroger Tex., Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. 2006) (elements and probable‑cause framing for malicious prosecution in Texas)
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (TCPA two‑step inquiry and what qualifies as “clear and specific evidence”)
Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015) (absolute‑privilege analysis for statements made in cooperating investigations and pretrial contexts)
Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Barron, 698 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1985) (unsolicited reports to police receiving only conditional privilege)
Zarate v. Cortinas, 553 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.–Corpus Christi 1977) (same)