860 F.3d 1218
9th Cir.2017Background
- Meza defaulted on a Wells Fargo credit account; the debt was sold to Portfolio Recovery Associates (PRA) and referred to law firm Hunt & Henriques (H&H) for collection.
- PRA filed a California limited civil collection action and served a CCP § 98 "declaration in lieu of personal testimony" signed by PRA employee Colby Eyre providing a "current address" c/o H&H and stating the affiant was "available for service of process" at that address within 150 miles of trial.
- Eyre lived more than 150 miles from the courthouse and the address in the declaration was not Eyre’s work address; H&H was authorized to accept service on Eyre’s behalf and H&H’s office fell within 150 miles.
- Meza sued in federal court alleging the § 98 declaration was invalid because the affiant was not personally available at the listed address, and that PRA’s use of the declaration violated the FDCPA by making a misleading representation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, interpreting § 98 to require only that the affiant be "available for service of process" within 150 miles (not physically present at the listed address), and entered judgment for PRA.
- The Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether § 98 requires the affiant to be physically located and personally available for service at the address provided in the declaration that is within 150 miles of the place of trial, and stayed further proceedings pending the state court’s answer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CCP § 98 requires the affiant to be physically located and personally available for service at the address provided that is within 150 miles of trial | Meza: "available for service of process" means physically present at the stated address so the opponent can secure attendance by personal delivery of a trial subpoena | PRA: "available for service of process" does not require physical presence at the listed address; Legislature deliberately used broader language allowing other forms/agents of service | The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the California Supreme Court and stayed the case (question unresolved by state court) |
Key Cases Cited
- Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1982) (discusses persuasive value of lower-court decisions)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71 (Cal. 2004) (statutory interpretation principles and giving words their usual meaning)
- Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural Examiners, 952 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1998) (statutory construction and when to consider legislative intent)
- People v. Soto, 245 P.3d 410 (Cal. 2011) (legislative rejection of specific provision informs interpretation)
- Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 522 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (importance of state-law answers for federal courts certifying questions)
- Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal court may attempt but is not the final expositor of state law)
- Pacheco v. United States, 220 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (similar guidance on predicting state law)