Judy Dahl v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C.
19-2197
| 7th Cir. | Jul 14, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Judy Dahl held Discover and Target credit cards and sent both creditors identical written notices in Feb. 2017 telling them to stop all communication and disputing the debt.
- Discover and TD Bank retained Kohn Law Firm to collect the accounts; Kohn sent Dahl two letters in Sept. 2017 acknowledging her no-contact request but stating federal law required certain notices and reciting FDCPA information.
- Dahl sued Kohn under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c), alleging the firm unlawfully communicated after she had demanded cessation of contact.
- Kohn moved to dismiss, arguing (1) §1692c(c) applies only where the cease notice is sent directly to the debt collector (not the creditor) and (2) the letters were informational/required by §1692g. The district court dismissed based on those grounds.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit raised Article III standing sua sponte, invited supplemental briefing, and concluded Dahl’s complaint failed to plead a concrete injury (no privacy invasion alleged); the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a consumer’s written cease notice to a creditor (not a collector) bars subsequent communications by a debt collector under §1692c(c) | Dahl: her notices to the creditors should prevent Kohn from communicating about the debts | Kohn: §1692c(c) by its text covers notices to debt collectors, not notices sent only to creditors | Not decided on the merits—district court had agreed with Kohn, but the Seventh Circuit did not reach the issue because it dismissed for lack of Article III standing |
| Whether Kohn’s letters were nonactionable informational communications or were permissible/required under §1692g | Dahl: the letters were communications violating §1692c(c) | Kohn: letters were informational or required by §1692g, thus permissible | Not decided on the merits—the district court treated them as permissible, but the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of standing |
| Whether Dahl alleged a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact sufficient for Article III standing | Dahl (in supplemental brief): the unwanted letters invaded her privacy; she also alleged confusion/futility | Kohn: Dahl did not plead a concrete injury; stress/confusion are insufficient | Held: Dahl failed to allege a concrete injury—her complaint did not assert a privacy invasion and allegations of confusion are not a standalone concrete injury; appeal vacated and case remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact)
- Pennell v. Global Trust Mgmt., LLC, 990 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2021) (complaint lacking privacy allegation cannot be broadened on appeal to establish FDCPA standing)
- Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (recognized privacy-based injury in TCPA text-message case)
- Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 982 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir. 2020) (stress or confusion alone do not constitute a concrete injury)
- Markakos v. Medicredit, Inc., 997 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2021) (an FDCPA violation by itself does not automatically confer Article III standing)
- DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (standing is jurisdictional; courts may raise it sua sponte)