Judd v. Bowen
2018 UT 47
| Utah | 2018Background
- A century-old circular driveway lies primarily on Bowen's property but historically provided shared access between the Bowen and Judd cabins in Big Cottonwood Canyon.
- In 2008 a Judd user refused to move a vehicle when Bowen requested; Bowens then blocked access and the Judds sued in 2011 seeking a prescriptive easement for ingress/egress and parking.
- After a four-day bench trial the district court found the Judds had a prescriptive easement for "reasonable access and parking" based on open, continuous, adverse use under a claim of right for twenty years, but did not specify the easement's precise start date or exact parameters.
- On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the access easement (limited in scope) but reversed the parking easement, concluding unlimited parking resembled exclusive possession requiring an adverse possession analysis.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions (standards for prescriptive easements, viability of prescriptive parking easements, and easement scope) but, after briefing and argument, revoked certiorari as improvidently granted because the case was factbound, the appellate panel relied on well-settled law, and the district court’s factual findings (e.g., date and parameters) were not challenged.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Judd) | Defendant's Argument (Bowen) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court of appeals misapplied legal standard for prescriptive access easement | Historic use met the elements (open, continuous, adverse, claim of right for 20 years) warranting an access easement | Court of appeals used incorrect definitions to create an easement | Court declined to reach merits on certiorari; court of appeals applied well-settled Utah standard and certiorari was improvidently granted |
| Whether parking easement can be established by prescription or requires adverse possession | Parking historically used and thus included in prescriptive rights | Parking was permissive or, if adverse, would be exclusive and thus akin to adverse possession | Court of Appeals: unlimited parking would exclude Bowen’s meaningful use and thus more closely resembles adverse possession; Supreme Court declined to address further on certiorari |
| Proper scope/parameters of any prescriptive easement (start date, limits) | Broad access and parking as historically used | Limit or deny rights beyond narrow access; no prescriptive parking | District court failed to specify exact parameters; because parties did not challenge factual findings, higher court would not resolve scope on certiorari |
| Whether Supreme Court should resolve broader legal questions about prescriptive parking easements | Urged Court to clarify law and validate prescriptive parking where appropriate | Opposed categorical recognition of prescriptive parking easements | Supreme Court: declined to address; case unsuitable for certiorari—no significant unsettled legal questions presented here |
Key Cases Cited
- Nyman v. Anchor Dev., L.L.C., 73 P.3d 357 (2003 UT) (distinguishing prescriptive easements from exclusive possession/adverse possession where use deprives owner of meaningful use)
- Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112 (2001 UT) (ultimate existence of an easement is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness)
- Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) (easement determinations are highly fact-dependent and district courts have broad discretion)
- Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984) (articulating prescriptive easement elements: open, notorious, adverse, continuous for twenty years)
- Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977) (similarly stating requirements for establishing a right-of-way by prescription)