Jubair Ahmad v. Israel Jacquez
20-35536
| 9th Cir. | Jul 1, 2021Background:
- Ahmad, a Pakistani national, was convicted in 2012 of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and is subject to an ICE detainer; projected release Nov. 21, 2021.
- He is housed at FDC SeaTac and requested transfer to a facility in Virginia within 500 driving miles of his family under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (First Step Act).
- BOP denied the request based on a preexisting Program Statement provision excluding inmates with ICE detainers from "nearer release" transfers; BOP updated parts of the policy after the First Step Act but retained the ICE-detainer exclusion.
- Ahmad administratively appealed but did not expressly argue that the ICE-detainer policy in the Program Statement exceeded statutory authority; he then filed a § 2241 habeas petition seeking BOP compliance with § 3621(b).
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Ahmad failed to exhaust administrative remedies (majority). Judge Silver concurred, agreeing with the affirmance but would have held habeas relief is not the proper vehicle for an inter-BOP transfer claim.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3621(b)’s jurisdiction-stripping clause bars judicial review of Ahmad’s transfer challenge | Ahmad sought enforcement of the First Step Act — BOP must place him nearer his primary residence; statute doesn’t consider immigration status | BOP: § 3621(b) makes individual designations nonreviewable by any court | Held: § 3621(b) strips courts of jurisdiction over individualized designation challenges; such individual challenges are not reviewable |
| Whether a challenge to BOP’s Program Statement (ICE-detainer exclusion) is separable from an individual designation and reviewable | Ahmad contends BOP policy circumvents the statutory mandate and should be subject to review | Gov’t: Ahmad’s claim cannot be severed from the individual designation and thus is barred; also challenges procedural vehicle | Held: Courts may review agency action that exceeds statutory authority, but a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing such a broader challenge |
| Whether Ahmad exhausted administrative remedies (or whether exhaustion should be excused as futile) | Ahmad argued to BOP that he sought relief under the First Step Act and requested implementation; contends futility exception should apply | Gov’t: Ahmad failed to raise the specific claim that the Program Statement exceeded statutory authority; exhaustion required | Held: Majority: Ahmad did not administratively raise the broader statutory-authority claim; exhaustion required and not waived as futile; claim unexhausted (affirmed on that ground) |
| Whether habeas (§ 2241) is a cognizable vehicle for seeking a transfer between BOP facilities | Ahmad framed relief as a § 2241 challenge to the location of confinement under § 3621(b) | Gov’t: Habeas is not the proper vehicle; relief should be sought by other means | Held: Majority did not reach this issue; concurrence (Judge Silver) would hold transfer claims between BOP locations are not cognizable in habeas and affirm on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (statute precluding review of individual administrative determinations does not bar collateral challenges to agency practices)
- Rodriguez v. Copenhaver, 823 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court lacks jurisdiction over discretionary designation decisions but may review whether BOP exceeded statutory authority)
- Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion required for habeas challenges to BOP actions; futility exception applies in narrow circumstances)
- Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1993) (challenge to informal BOP Program Statement may be excused from exhaustion when futile)
- Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2021) (distinguishes subject-matter jurisdiction from whether relief is cognizable in habeas)
- Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (§ 2241 commonly used when relief could shorten custody or affect sentence execution)
- Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989) (habeas may be used to seek relief from greater restrictions on liberty, such as disciplinary segregation)
- Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2020) (implied cause of action exists for injunctive challenges to unconstitutional conditions of confinement)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) (federal courts may grant injunctive relief to prevent violations of federal law by federal officials)