Juarez v. 449 Restaurant, Inc.
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94011
S.D.N.Y.2014Background
- Plaintiff Vincente Juarez worked as a cook at three Moonstruck Diner locations in Manhattan from ~2007 to July 23, 2013 and was paid a flat weekly salary without overtime or spread-of-hours premiums.
- Three corporate defendants (449 Restaurant, Inc.; 88 2nd Ave. Food Corp.; Pirgos Food Corp.) each own a diner location; John Kapetanos allegedly owns/controls the diner chain and directed employees across locations.
- Juarez sued under the FLSA and New York law seeking collective/class relief for unpaid overtime, spread-of-hours, and wage notice/statement violations; he moved for conditional certification, court-authorized notice, and expedited discovery.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss claims against Second Avenue and Pirgos, arguing Juarez did not allege he worked over 40 hours for those entities specifically.
- The Court denied Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion, finding Juarez plausibly alleged a single integrated enterprise (shared operations, management, uniforms, website, Kapetanos’s role) and thus all entities may be a single FLSA employer.
- The Court granted conditional certification for notice to non-exempt workers (cooks, food preparers, dishwashers, etc.) at all three diner locations, directed the parties to meet and confer on notice content and distribution, and set a submission schedule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Second Avenue and Pirgos can be liable under the FLSA despite Juarez not alleging he worked >40 hours at those specific entities | Juarez: the three diner entities operate as a single integrated enterprise under factors (interrelated operations, centralized labor control, common management/ownership), so all comprise his employer | Defendants: separate entities; Juarez fails to plead he worked >40 hours for those specific defendants, so claims against them should be dismissed | Denied Defendants’ 12(c) motion — allegations suffice to plausibly plead a single integrated enterprise, so all entities may be treated as the employer at this stage |
| Whether conditional certification/notice to employees at all three diners is appropriate | Juarez: modest factual showing ties him to employees at all locations (worked at multiple sites, shared uniforms/menus/website, Kapetanos’s control) | Defendants: Juarez’s limited work at other sites and ‘‘bare belief’’ about ownership/control are insufficient to show a common unlawful policy | Granted conditional certification for all three locations — Juarez met the low initial burden to show a factual nexus binding potential opt-ins as victims of a common policy |
| Standard for initial collective-action certification under the FLSA | Juarez: courts use the two-step Myers approach; only a modest factual showing is required at the notice stage | N/A (dispute focuses on application) | Court applied Myers two-step framework and required only a modest factual showing; did not resolve factual disputes |
| Form and distribution of court-authorized notice | Juarez: submitted proposed notice and methods | Defendants: object to text and dissemination method | Parties ordered to meet and confer; court reserved ruling on contested notice details and set a briefing/submission schedule |
Key Cases Cited
- Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (discusses employer definitions under the FLSA and multi-factor inquiry)
- Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzes who qualifies as an ‘‘employer’’ under the FLSA)
- Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Mktg., LLC, 425 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that entities within a single integrated enterprise can be jointly liable)
- Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010) (establishes the two-step framework for FLSA collective-action notice and certification)
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1989) (authorizes judicial facilitation of notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard: plausible claim required)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading standard; plausibility and rejection of bare conclusions)