Juan Vega v. City of Hammond and City of Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 287
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Vega owned 4839 Elm St. in Hammond; city inspectors found an unsafe, unpermitted second-floor apartment and issued a Notice of Violation in November 2012 ordering repair or demolition.
- The Board of Public Works and Safety repeatedly continued hearings over ~2+ years; hearings occurred November 13, 2014, April 30, 2015, and May 7, 2015, with video of those hearings introduced at judicial review.
- Vega sought a re-inspection before a final merits ruling; his counsel contacted the inspector (Saliga) but initially received no response; at a later deposition Saliga admitted he had forgotten about Vega’s letter and had “misspoke” at the hearing about being contacted.
- The Board adopted findings on May 7, 2015 ordering removal of the second-floor apartment; Vega filed a verified complaint for judicial review under Ind. Code § 36-7-9-8.
- At the bench trial Vega presented evidence (videos, transcripts, depositions) and then rested; the City moved for a directed verdict (treated as a Trial Rule 41(B) involuntary dismissal) and the trial court granted it without explanation; Vega’s motion to correct errors was denied.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court erred in dismissing Vega’s judicial-review complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case because Vega had produced evidence supporting that the Board’s action was arbitrary and capricious—principally that a promised re-inspection did not occur and the Board acted based on delay rather than merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused discretion by granting directed verdict / involuntary dismissal at close of Vega’s case | Vega argues he met his burden for de novo judicial review by presenting relevant evidence (videos, depositions) showing the Board acted arbitrarily by refusing the agreed re‑inspection and ending the matter for delay | City argued Vega failed to present the full administrative record and failed to show the Board’s findings were arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported; therefore dismissal was proper | Reversed: court erred to dismiss at close of Vega’s case; Vega presented sufficient evidence that the Board’s decision may have been arbitrary and capricious and was not required to file the entire administrative record under the municipal review statute |
| Whether complainant must file the entire administrative record in judicial review under Ind. Code § 36-7-9-8 | Vega: statute requires only a verified complaint including the findings and action; trial evidence sufficed (videos, exhibits) | City: AOPA requires filing the full agency record so the trial court can review the administrative action | Held: AOPA does not apply to a municipal works board; §36-7-9-8 does not require filing the entire administrative record; Vega was not obligated to present the full AOPA-style record |
| Standard of review for de novo judicial review of municipal unsafe-building order | Vega: trial court should hear evidence and may reverse if Board’s action was arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, unsupported, or beyond authority | City: Board’s findings entitled to deference; lacking full record court had no basis to overturn | Held: Court applies the limited de novo standard (may negate only if arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, unsupported, or in excess of authority); Vega presented evidence raising those issues |
| Whether trial court’s procedural labeling (T.R. 50) and failure to enter findings was reversible error | Vega: T.R. 50 is improper at bench trial and court’s use prevented proper findings | City: not argued as central | Held: Any error from mislabeling as T.R. 50 and not entering findings was waived because Vega did not request findings at the time of the motion under T.R. 41(B) |
Key Cases Cited
- Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445 (Ind. 1999) (directed-verdict/Judgment-on-evidence motions at bench trial are treated as T.R. 41(B) involuntary-dismissal motions)
- Kollar v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (statutory "de novo" review of municipal demolition/demolition-like orders is limited: agency findings may be negated only if arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, unsupported by evidence, or beyond authority)
- Uhlir v. Ritz, 264 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 1970) (describing standards for when a reviewing court may negate administrative findings)
- Brown v. Guinn, 970 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (T.R. 41(B) tests sufficiency of plaintiff’s case in chief; appellate review examines evidence most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Fishburn v. Ind. Pub. Retirement Sys., 2 N.E.3d 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (defines arbitrary and capricious as willful, unreasonable, or without consideration of facts)
- Puckett v. Miller, 381 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (procedural discussion on T.R. 41(B) and directed-verdict analogues in bench trials)