Juan Valdez v. Michael Benov
13-16736
| 9th Cir. | Nov 3, 2017Background
- Valdez, a federal inmate at Taft Correctional Institution (a privately operated federal prison), was found to have violated Prohibited Act Code 328 for receiving $250 in his commissary account from another inmate’s wife.
- A disciplinary hearing imposed a sanction of 13 days forfeiture of Good Conduct Time (GCT); administrative appeals were denied.
- Valdez filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the disciplinary process as procedurally deficient and contrary to federal regulations.
- While his appeal was pending, the Bureau of Prisons restored Valdez’s 13 days of GCT, but his disciplinary record still reflected the Code 328 violation.
- Valdez acknowledged the restoration but argued the case was not moot under two exceptions: collateral consequences (record mark could cause future harm) and voluntary cessation (prison could reimpose sanction or reengage in conduct).
- The Ninth Circuit concluded the restoration mooted the habeas claim because neither collateral consequences nor voluntary cessation exceptions applied and dismissed the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the case is moot after restoration of GCT | Valdez: not moot because Code 328 conviction remains on record and may cause collateral consequences | BOP/TCI: restoration removed the punitive effect; no live controversy | Moot. Restoration of GCT removed live injury; record mark’s future use was speculative and insufficient to avoid mootness |
| Whether collateral-consequences exception saves the case | Valdez: disciplinary record could lead to harsher future sanctions, so a personal stake remains | Respondents: speculative future harm contingent on future misconduct and punishment | Not applicable. Prisoner must prove concrete collateral consequences; possibility of future sanction is too speculative |
| Whether voluntary-cessation exception saves the case | Valdez: TCI could resume wrongful conduct after dismissal, so cessation not necessarily permanent | Respondents: sanction has been undone and cannot be reimposed for same offense | Not applicable. It is not reasonably likely the exact wrongful conduct will recur; cessation moots the claim |
| Standard for burden to prove collateral consequences in disciplinary context | Valdez: presumption of collateral consequences applies | Respondents: presumption for criminal convictions does not extend to prison discipline; prisoner bears burden | Court: applies Wilson; prisoner bears burden and failed to show concrete collateral consequences |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2003) (prison disciplinary proceedings do not receive the same presumption of continuing collateral consequences as criminal convictions)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (presumption of continuing collateral consequences for convictions; speculative future harm insufficient for Article III)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (voluntary cessation moots a case unless the conduct could reasonably be expected to recur)
- United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968) (standard for when voluntary cessation does not moot litigation)
- United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (case-or-controversy requires a personal stake throughout proceedings)