842 F.3d 513
7th Cir.2016Background
- Juan Suarez bought a one‑gallon can of acetone‑based "Professional Strength Goof Off" (extremely flammable) and used it to remove paint from a basement concrete floor. The can had prominent English and Spanish warnings including: “DANGER! EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE,” keep away from heat/sparks/flame/other sources of ignition, ventilate, and a direction to “[a]pply directly. Agitate with brush.”
- Juan opened a basement window and two doors before use but it is unclear whether pilot lights for two water heaters and a furnace were turned off. After applying Goof Off and agitating/spreading it with his foot and a kitchen broom, a fire erupted and Juan suffered severe burns.
- The Suarezes sued W.M. Barr alleging (1) failure to warn under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act labeling requirements and (2) defective design (strict liability and negligence), claiming ignition likely resulted from static sparks generated during brush agitation.
- Barr moved for summary judgment and to exclude the Suarezes’ experts. The district court granted summary judgment for Barr, holding the label complied with federal requirements and that Goof Off was not unreasonably dangerous; it also found insufficient evidence of feasible alternatives or testing failures.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of the failure‑to‑warn claim (label adequately stated principal hazards and precautionary measures and the Act preempts state law claims seeking additional warnings) but reversed and remanded as to design defect claims (both strict liability and negligence), finding genuine factual disputes about static‑spark ignition, consumer expectations, risk‑utility balancing, feasibility of a nonflammable water‑based alternative, and whether Barr knew or should have known about the hazard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to warn under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act | Label failed to warn of specific hazard: static sparks from brush agitation; label’s instruction to agitate with a brush undermines precautions | Label plainly identified principal hazard (extreme flammability) and multiple precautionary measures; Act does not require listing every conceivable ignition source; state claims requiring extra warnings are preempted | Affirmed: label satisfied §1261(p) for principal hazards and precautionary measures; no additional warning required |
| Strict products liability — consumer‑expectation test | Ordinary consumer would not expect that following label instruction to agitate with a brush could create static sparks sufficient to ignite vapors | User disregarded warnings (e.g., against use in basements, failure to extinguish pilot lights); insufficient proof static sparks actually caused ignition | Reversed/Remanded: genuine factual dispute exists whether consumer would expect ignition from brush agitation and whether static spark was likely ignition source |
| Strict products liability — risk‑utility test / feasible alternative | Benefits of acetone formulation may be outweighed by risk; a water‑based, nonflammable Goof Off exists and is a feasible, cost‑effective alternative | No affirmative evidence water‑based product was a viable substitute for the acetone formulation in this use; plaintiff failed to prove alternatives feasible | Reversed/Remanded: factual dispute as to feasibility, cost, practicality of water‑based alternative; risk‑utility question for jury |
| Negligent design / manufacturer knowledge and testing | Barr knew or should have known static ignition risk and failed to test for static ignition; lack of internal testing/discussion supports negligence | Plaintiffs did not plead or prove failure to test specifically for static ignition; causation and methodology of expert opinions unreliable under Daubert | Reversed/Remanded: genuine factual dispute whether Barr negligently designed/failed to test; Daubert challenges unresolved and for district court on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment standard and view of facts for nonmoving party)
- Mwesigwa v. DAP, Inc., 637 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2011) (preemption under FHSA and sufficiency of labeling as identifying principal hazards)
- Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting FHSA preemption of state‑law warning claims)
- Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008) (strict products liability elements and design‑defect tests)
- Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990) (consumer‑expectation and risk‑utility tests for design defect)
- Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 2011) (risk‑utility factors list in Illinois law)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (standards for admissibility of expert testimony)