897 F.3d 1125
9th Cir.2018Background
- June 2, 2016: Trump rally at San Jose McEnery Convention Center; police anticipated large crowd and deployed ~250 officers with mutual aid and riot gear.
- Attendees allege officers directed them to exit through a single east‑northeast exit, formed a skirmish line, prevented alternative exits, and required them to turn into a crowd of violent anti‑Trump protesters.
- Attendees allege assaults (beatings, broken nose, tackles, thrown objects) that occurred after officers shepherded them toward protesters; officers witnessed or had notice of prior assaults earlier that evening.
- Plaintiffs filed a § 1983 class action asserting a state‑created danger / due process claim against individual officers and a Monell claim against the City based on Chief Garcia’s post‑rally praise and failure to discipline (ratification).
- District court denied officers’ qualified immunity and denied dismissal of the Monell claim; officers and City appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified immunity for individual officers | Officers affirmatively placed attendees in greater danger by directing them into a violent crowd and acted with deliberate indifference; thus no immunity | Officers say crowd was already dangerous and police involvement didn’t create a new danger; qualified immunity applies | Denied: on FAC, plaintiffs plausibly pleaded state‑created danger (affirmative acts + deliberate indifference) and rights were clearly established; qualified immunity denied at motion‑to‑dismiss stage |
| State‑created danger / Due Process violation | Shepherding attendees into protesters and blocking safer exits increased risk and was foreseeable; officers knew of assaults that evening | Officers contend they did not create a danger different from the existing rally risk; DeShaney bars liability for mere inaction | Held for plaintiffs at pleading stage: affirmative police conduct allegedly left plaintiffs in a more dangerous position and officers were deliberately indifferent |
| Whether law was clearly established | Plaintiffs cite Ninth Circuit precedent applying state‑created danger to similar contexts (Kennedy, Johnson) | Officers contend prior cases are too factually dissimilar to give fair notice | Held: Johnson and related precedent gave fair warning in the crowd‑control context; this was also an "obvious case" where unlawfulness was apparent—qualified immunity unavailable now |
| Monell municipal liability and appellate jurisdiction | Plaintiffs: Chief Garcia’s public praise and failure to discipline plausibly ratified officers’ unconstitutional conduct | City: argues municipal appeal not permitted via interlocutory qualified‑immunity route; claims issues are intertwined | Court lacked jurisdiction over City’s interlocutory appeal because Monell ratification question is not inextricably intertwined with the qualified immunity issue; City’s appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (state‑created danger: affirmative acts that place plaintiff in more dangerous position can give rise to due process claim)
- Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (applies state‑created danger doctrine to crowd‑control context; officers may be liable for abandoning active control and confining persons to danger)
- Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (officers’ affirmative actions that expose a person to additional risk can trigger liability)
- Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (officer actions that strand a person in dangerous circumstances can give rise to duty and liability)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (generally no constitutional duty to protect from private violence absent state creation of danger)
- Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 for official policy or ratification of unconstitutional acts)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity is permissible)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (clearly established rights may be shown by general constitutional principles when unlawfulness is obvious)